The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC): “Treasury Removes Sanctions on Iraqi Bank”

May 17, 2013

The U.S. Department of the Treasury on May 17, 2013 released the following:

Action Follows a Verified Change of Behavior from the Elaf Islamic Bank

WASHINGTON – The Department of the Treasury today lifted sanctions against the Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq following the bank’s significant and demonstrated change in behavior.

On July 31, 2012 the Treasury Department imposed sanctions under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA), against Elaf Islamic Bank, a privately-owned Iraqi financial institution, for knowingly facilitating significant transactions and providing significant financial services for the U.S. and EU-designated Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI). Following the CISADA finding, Elaf immediately engaged the Treasury Department and began an intensive course of action to stop the conduct that led to the CISADA sanction, including freezing EDBI accounts at Elaf and reducing its overall exposure to the Iranian financial sector. Following today’s action U.S. financial institutions are once again permitted to open or maintain correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts in the United States for Elaf Islamic Bank.

“Today we welcome Elaf Islamic Bank back into the U.S. financial system, and we urge other designated individuals and entities around the world to follow its positive example. As today’s delisting demonstrates, our sanctions are flexible and can be lifted if the conduct that led to the sanction terminates,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “As we increase our sanctions against Iran, we will continue to target any financial institution that works with designated Iranian banks or attempts to assist Iran in evading sanctions.”

Sanctions may be, and regularly are, lifted when circumstances warrant, which includes ceasing the sanctionable activity. Any sanctioned party may petition OFAC for sanctions to be lifted. In general, demonstrating changes in circumstances or behavior are essential to the lifting of sanctions.

Treasury will continue to use all tools at its disposal to target entities or individuals engaging in sanctionable activity related to Iran. CISADA was signed into law by President Obama in July 2010. Among other things, CISADA provides the Secretary of the Treasury with the authority to impose strict conditions on, or prohibit the opening or maintaining of, correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts in the United States for foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate a significant transaction or provide significant financial services for a person whose property and interests in property are blocked under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act in connection with Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or delivery systems for WMD, or for Iran’s support for international terrorism.”

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Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

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————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

————————————————————–

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Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators [NPWMD] Entries Added to OFAC’s SDN List on May 10, 2013

May 10, 2013
OFAC - Office of Foreign Assets Control
OFAC – Office of Foreign Assets Control
(Source: Treasury.gov)

Today, OFAC has added [NPWMD] Entries to the Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN List):

The following [NPWMD] entries have been added to OFAC’s SDN List list:

CHANG, Tony (a.k.a. CHANG, Wen-Fu; a.k.a. ZHANG, Wen-Fu); DOB 01 Apr 1965; nationality Taiwan; Passport 211606395 (Taiwan) (individual) [NPWMD].

CHANG, Wen-Fu (a.k.a. CHANG, Tony; a.k.a. ZHANG, Wen-Fu); DOB 01 Apr 1965; nationality Taiwan; Passport 211606395 (Taiwan) (individual) [NPWMD].

FENG SHENG CO., LTD. (a.k.a. TRANS MULTI MECHANICS CO. LTD.), 19, Chin Ho Lane, Chung Cheng Rd., Taya District, Taichung City, Taiwan; No 19, Jinhe Lane, Zhongzheng Road, Daya District, Taichung City, Taiwan [NPWMD].

TRANS MULTI MECHANICS CO. LTD. (a.k.a. FENG SHENG CO., LTD.), 19, Chin Ho Lane Chung Cheng Rd., Taya District, Taichung City, Taiwan; No 19, Jinhe Lane, Zhongzheng Road, Daya District, Taichung City, Taiwan [NPWMD].

ZHANG, Wen-Fu (a.k.a. CHANG, Tony; a.k.a. CHANG, Wen-Fu); DOB 01 Apr 1965; nationality Taiwan; Passport 211606395 (Taiwan) (individual) [NPWMD].”

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Treasury Sanctions Taiwan Proliferators Linked to North Korea

5/10/2013

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated one Taiwan entity and one Taiwan individual pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, an authority aimed at freezing the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters. Trans Multi Mechanics Co. Ltd. and Chang Wen-Fu were designated for their links to a North Korean procurement agent, Alex H.T. Tsai. Alex Tsai and his son, Yueh-Hsun Tsai, were recently arrested in Estonia and the United States, respectively, and each was charged in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, pursuant to criminal complaints unsealed on May 1, 2013, with conspiring to defraud the United States in its enforcement of laws and regulations prohibiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

“It is essential that we continue to make it as difficult as possible for North Korea to facilitate its nuclear and ballistic missile programs by exposing key cogs in North Korea’s procurement network,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “We will continue to work with our partners in Federal law enforcement and our friends around the world to expose anyone assisting the North Korean government’s illicit procurement activities.”

Alex Tsai was designated by the Treasury Department on January 16, 2009 for providing support to North Korea’s premier arms dealer, Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID), which was listed in the Annex to E.O. 13382 and designated at the United Nations in April 2009. Tsai’s wife, Lu-chi Su, and two companies Tsai controlled, Global Interface Company and Trans Merits Co. Ltd. were also designated by Treasury in January 2009.

Chang Wen-Fu has been identified as the CEO and general manager of Trans Multi Mechanics Co. Ltd. and has been actively involved in the procurement of dual-use machinery for North Korea. Alex Tsai has used Trans Multi Mechanics Co. Ltd. to procure and ship hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of equipment to North Korea and to negotiate contracts on behalf of North Korean parties.

Trans Multi Mechanics Co. Ltd. was further alleged to have been involved in some of the purchases which resulted in the charges against Alex Tsai and his son. Based on the Tsai family’s support for KOMID, these actions are consistent with U.S. implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2094, which requires Member States to sanction any individual or entity acting for or on behalf of a UN-designated individual or entity.

U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in any transactions with the entities listed today, and any assets those entities may have subject to U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.

Identifying information:

Name: Trans Multi Mechanics Co. Ltd.

AKA: Feng Sheng Co., Ltd.

Location: 19, Chin Ho Lane, Chung Cheng Rd., Taya District, Taichung City, Taiwan

Alt. Location: No 19, Jinhe Lane, Zhongzheng Road, Daya District, Taichung City, Taiwan

Name: Chang Wen-Fu

AKA: Tony Chang

AKA: Zhang Wen-Fu

DOB: April 01, 1965

Nationality/Passport Issuing Authority: Taiwan

Passport Number: 211606395 (Taiwan)”

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Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

————————————————————–

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Regulator Says British Bank Helped Iran Hide Deals

August 7, 2012

The New York Times on August 6, 2012 released the following:

“By JESSICA SILVER-GREENBERG

Using its New York-based operations, a major British bank schemed with the Iranian government for nearly a decade to launder $250 billion, leaving the United States financial system vulnerable to terrorists and corrupt regimes, New York’s top banking regulator charged on Monday.

The New York State Department of Financial Services accused Standard Chartered, which the agency called a “rogue institution,” of masking more than 60,000 transactions for Iranian banks and corporations, motivated by the millions of dollars it reaped in fees.

Senior management at the 150-year-old bank used the New York branch “as a front for prohibited dealings with Iran — dealings that indisputably helped sustain a global threat to peace and stability,” according to a regulatory order sent to the bank. The order requires the bank to explain the apparent violations of law in a hearing later this month and justify why its license to operate in New York shouldn’t be revoked.

The bank said Monday night that it “strongly rejects the position and portrayal of facts” by the agency.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation said that it had an open investigation into money laundering at Standard Chartered. In the order, regulators paint a vivid picture of a cover-up that included the code name “Project Gazelle,” money flowing to Iran’s central bank, United States executives warning of “criminal liability,” and a manual that taught employees how to automate the masking of a rising number of illegal transactions.

The accusations against Standard Chartered come as United States officials work to crack down on the flow of money to foreign countries, companies and individuals connected to terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and drug trafficking.

Beyond the dealings with Iran, the banking regulator said it had discovered evidence that Standard Chartered operated “similar schemes” to do business with other countries under United States sanctions, including Myanmar (formerly Burma), Libya and Sudan.

Earlier Monday, a spokesman for Standard Chartered said the bank was reviewing its “historical U.S. sanctions compliance and is discussing that review with U.S. enforcement agencies and regulators.”

But the order accuses senior executives at the bank of suppressing complaints. For example, in 2006, according to the order, the bank’s chief executive for the Americas wrote his bosses in London that the transactions had “the potential to cause very serious or even catastrophic reputational damage to the group.”

According to the order, the response was hostile, denigrated Americans and asked: “Who are you to tell us, the rest of the world, that we’re not going to deal with Iranians.” The department of financial services, led by superintendent Benjamin M. Lawsky, said it was “impossible to know” how much of the money might have been used by Iran to finance its nuclear program or to support terrorist organizations.

Mr. Lawsky said that the department, which examined more than 30,000 internal memos, e-mails and other documents in its nine-month investigation, will hold hearings to determine any financial penalty.

Standard Chartered is the latest in a series of global banks to be accused of facilitating illegal flows of money from outside the United States. In July, a Senate panel issued a report that accused HSBC of being used by Mexican drug cartels to funnel cash back into the United States, by Saudi Arabian banks with terrorist ties that needed access to dollars and by Iranians who wanted to circumvent United States sanctions.

In June, the Justice Department and the New York County district attorney’s office reached a $619 million settlement with ING Bank over accusations that it had illegally moved billions of dollars into the United States for sanctioned Cuban and Iranian entities.

The “apparent fraudulent and deceptive conduct” by Standard Chartered occurred from 2001 to 2010, the order said, and was particularly “egregious,” because some of the transactions were being processed even as the bank was under formal oversight by New York banking regulators from 2004 to 2007.

Standard Chartered, which is based in London, relies for most of its profit on business in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.

Before 2008, the federal government permitted money to be transferred through the United States from one non-American based entity to another, but only after being thoroughly vetted to detect suspicious activity. In so-called U-turn transactions, a foreign institution routes money to a bank in the United States, which transfers the money immediately to a separate foreign institution.

Suspecting that Iran was using its banks — including the Central Bank of Iran/Markazi, Bank Saderat and Bank Melli — to finance nuclear weapons and missile programs, the policy toward Iran changed and the transactions were banned entirely in 2008.

The order on Monday cited those Iranian state-owned banks as clients of Standard Chartered.

Standard Chartered disputed the accusations and said that “well over 99.9 percent of the transactions relating to Iran complied with the U-turn regulations.” Those that did not comply amounted to less than $14 million, the bank said.

The bank said in its statement late Monday that it had kept federal and state authorities apprised of the review it initiated in 2010. It said that it “did not identify a single payment” connected to a terrorist entity or organization and that it had “ceased all new business with Iranian customers” five years ago.

The apparent illegal activity stretched back to 1995 after President Bill Clinton levied sanctions against Iran. At the time, the general counsel of Standard Chartered e-mailed the bank’s chief compliance officer a plan to ignore regulations imposed by a division of the Treasury Department, according to the order.

In the e-mails included in the order, the executives said a memo containing the plan “MUST NOT be sent to the U.S.,” to prevent prosecution.

That strategy of flouting the United States law was commonplace by 2001, Mr. Lawsky said. An e-mail from a lawyer to bank executives in 2001 said that payment instructions for Iranian clients “should not identify the client or the purpose of the payment.”

One Iranian client, for example, was told to use “NO NAME GIVEN” in paperwork to transfer money, the order said. That way, the money transfer could escape scrutiny and “not appear to N.Y. to have come from an Iranian bank,” a 2003 e-mail from a Standard Chartered official said.

In a strategy called Project Gazelle, the bank devised to forge “new relationships with Iranian companies” and intermediaries “in oil- and gas- related businesses,” a memo from 2005 included in the order said.

The bank’s management created a formal operating manual called “Quality Operating Procedure Iranian Bank Processing,” that showed staff members how to strip off information that might tie them to the sanctioned Iranian institutions.

The bank came under scrutiny from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 2003 after regulators discovered deficiencies in monitoring its transactions.

As a result, the bank entered a formal agreement with regulators that it strengthen its oversight and bring in an independent consultant to inspect transactions from July 2002 to October 2004.

Even the independent monitoring, by Deloitte & Touche, was perverted, according to Mr. Lawsky. In 2005, at the behest of the bank, Deloitte agreed to omit critical transactions from its report to regulators. “This is too much and too politically sensitive for both SCB and Deloitte. That is why I drafted the watered-down version,” a Deloitte executive said in a 2005 e-mail in the order.

Deloitte denies it aided the bank. The consultant “performed its role as independent consultant properly and had no knowledge of any alleged misconduct by bank employees,” Jonathan Gandal, a Deloitte spokesman said in a statement. “Allegations otherwise are unsupported by the facts.” In its last examination of the bank, in 2011, the state’s Department of Financial Services said it had found “continuing and significant” failures in complying with bank secrecy and money laundering laws.”

————————————————————–

Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

————————————————————–

International criminal defense questions, but want to be anonymous?

Free Skype Tel: +1.202.470.3427, OR

Free Skype call:

           Office Locations

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Recent OFAC Actions: Non-Proliferation Designations

March 31, 2011

As of today, OFAC has designated several assets and made several changes to existing non-proliferation designations. OFAC has also removed several designations from the Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN List).

Under the non-proliferation sanctions program, OFAC has the ability to designate individuals, organizations, entities and assets on the SDN List in an effort to isolate them from U.S. financial and commercial systems.

Vessels, the primary target of today’s OFAC actions, are typically designated under the non-proliferation sanctions because they are capable of transporting weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Today’s designations include vessels that are allegedly associated with the Islamic Republic of Iran of Shipping Lines (IRISL).

To view OFAC’s press release which goes into more detail regarding today’s designations, please click here.

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

DORITA (f.k.a. IRAN MOEIN); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8605234 (Iran) (vessel) [NPWMD]

KADOS (f.k.a. IRAN SAHEL); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9137258 (Iran) (vessel) [NPWMD]

SALIM; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9465851 (Malta) (vessel) [NPWMD]

The following deletions have been made to OFAC’s SDN list:

DEVELOPER (a.k.a. IRAN DEVELOPER) Bulk Carrier 43,300DWT 25,768GRT IRAN flag (IRISL); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8309660 (vessel) [NPWMD]

IRAN DEVELOPER (a.k.a. DEVELOPER) Bulk Carrier 43,300DWT 25,768GRT IRAN flag (IRISL) (vessel) [NPWMD]

IRAN AZADI Bulk Carrier 35,839DWT 20,672GRT Iran flag (IRISL); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 7632838 (vessel) [NPWMD]

IRAN BAGHAEI General Cargo 17,945DWT 13,914GRT Iran flag (IRISL); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 7502734 (vessel) [NPWMD]

IRAN BAGHERI General Cargo 17,928DWT 13,914GRT Iran flag (IRISL); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 7428811 (vessel) [NPWMD]

IRAN BROOJERDI General Cargo 17,929DWT 13,914GRT Iran flag (IRISL); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 7502722 (vessel) [NPWMD]

IRAN MAHALLATI General Cargo 17,982DWT 13,914GRT Iran flag (IRISL); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 7428823 (vessel) [NPWMD]

IRAN MODARES Bulk Carrier 33,663DWT 20,049GRT Iran flag (IRISL); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 7618985 (vessel) [NPWMD]

IRAN NABUVAT General Cargo 19,212DWT 14,856GRT Iran flag (IRISL); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 7618571 (vessel) [NPWMD]

IRAN TAKHTI General Cargo 23,720DWT 16,173GRT Iran flag (IRISL); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 7602194 (vessel) [NPWMD]

IRAN TEYFOURI General Cargo 23,720DWT 16,173GRT Iran flag (IRISL); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 7602211 (vessel) [NPWMD]

The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN list:

DAFFODIL (a.k.a. ELEVENTH OCEAN); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9209324 (Germany) (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
DAFFODIL (|f.k.a. ELEVENTH OCEAN|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9209324 (Malta)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

DANDLE (a.k.a. TWELFTH OCEAN); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9209348 (Germany) (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
DANDLE (|f.k.a. TWELFTH OCEAN|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9209348 (Malta)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

DECKER (a.k.a. FIFTH OCEAN); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9349667 (Germany) (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
DECKER (|f.k.a. FIFTH OCEAN|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9349667 (Malta)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

EIGHTH OCEAN; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9165803 (Germany) (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
EIGHTH OCEAN|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9165803 (Malta)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

GABION (a.k.a. SEVENTH OCEAN); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9165786 (Germany) (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
GABION (|f.k.a. SEVENTH OCEAN|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9165786 (Malta)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

GALAX (a.k.a. NINTH OCEAN); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9165798 (Germany) (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
GALAX (|f.k.a. NINTH OCEAN|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9165798 (Malta)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

GLADIOLUS (a.k.a. TENTH OCEAN); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9165815 (Germany) (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
GLADIOLUS (|f.k.a. TENTH OCEAN|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9165815 (Malta)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING CO (a.k.a. HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING LINES COMPANY; a.k.a. HDS LINES), No 60, Ehteshamiyeh Square, 7th Neyestan Street, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Business Registration Document # 5478431 issued Mar 2009 [NPWMD]
-to-
HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING CO (a.k.a. HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING LINES COMPANY; a.k.a. HDS LINES), |No 60, Ehteshamiyeh Square, 7th Neyestan Street, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran; BIC Container Code HDXU; Business Registration Document # 5478431 issued Mar 2009| [NPWMD]

IRAN GOLESTAN; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9226944 (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
|GOLESTAN| (|f.k.a. IRAN GOLESTAN|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9226944 (Malta)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

IRAN HAMADAN; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9226956 (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
|HAMADAN| (|f.k.a. IRAN HAMADAN|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9226956 (Malta)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

IRAN MAZANDARAN; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9193197 (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
|MAZANDARAN| (|f.k.a. IRAN MAZANDARAN|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9193197 (Malta)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

IRAN NOWSHAHR; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9367994 (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
|SANIA| (|f.k.a. IRAN NOWSHAHR|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9367994 (Iran)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

IRAN TORKAMAN; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9368015 (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
|SOMIA| (|f.k.a. IRAN TORKAMAN|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9368015 (Iran)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

KHORASAN (a.k.a. IRAN KHORASAN); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9193214 (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
|DORSAN| (|f.k.a. IRAN KHORASAN; f.k.a. KHORASAN|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9193214 (Malta)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

LANCELIN (a.k.a. IRAN YAZD); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9213387 (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
|ATENA| (|f.k.a. IRAN YAZD; f.k.a. LANCELIN|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9213387 (Cyprus)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

SAKAS (a.k.a. IRAN PIROOZI); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9283007 (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
|PARMIS| (|f.k.a. IRAN PIROOZI; f.k.a. SAKAS|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9283007 (Barbados)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

SEIBOW LOGISTICS LIMITED, Room 803, 8/F, Futura Plaza, 111 How Kimg St, Kwun Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China; Business Registration Document # 1218675 issued 18 Mar 2008 [NPWMD]
-to-
SEIBOW LOGISTICS LIMITED, |Room 803, 8/F, Futura Plaza, 111 How Kimg St, Kwun Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China; BIC Container Code SBAU; Business Registration Document # 1218675 issued 18 Mar 2008| [NPWMD]

SEPANTA (a.k.a. IRAN ARDEBIL); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9284154 (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
|TANDIS| (|f.k.a. IRAN ARDEBIL; f.k.a. SEPANTA|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9284154 (Barbados)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

SEPITAM (a.k.a. IRAN ILAM); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9283033 (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
|HADIS| (|f.k.a. IRAN ILAM; f.k.a. SEPITAM|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9283033 (Barbados)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

SEWAK (a.k.a. IRAN FARS); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9283021 (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
|SALIS| (|f.k.a. IRAN FARS; f.k.a. SEWAK|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9283021 (Barbados)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

SIMBER (a.k.a. IRAN YASOOJ); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9284142 (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
|PARDIS| (|f.k.a. IRAN YASOOJ; f.k.a. SIMBER|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9284142 (Barbados)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

VISEA (a.k.a. IRAN ZANJAN); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9283019 (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
|ARMIS| (|f.k.a. IRAN ZANJAN; f.k.a. VISEA|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9283019 (Barbados)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

ZAWA (a.k.a. IRAN AZARBAYJAN); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9193185 (vessel) [NPWMD]
-to-
|NAFIS| (|f.k.a. IRAN AZARBAYJAN; f.k.a. ZAWA|)|; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9193185 (Cyprus)| (vessel) [NPWMD]

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Douglas McNabb and other members of the firm practice and write extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition and OFAC SDN List Removal.

The author of this blog is Douglas McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

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