Russian ship bound for Syria reverses course

June 19, 2012

The Washington Post on June 19, 2012 released the following:

“By Karla Adam and Debbi Wilgoren

LONDON — British Foreign Secretary William Hague told Parliament on Tuesday that a Russian ship believed to be carrying helicopters and weapons had aborted its journey to Syria after losing insurance coverage.

The British government informed the Standard Club insurance company that continuing to insure the MV Alaed ship would violate European sanctions against the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad if the ship was found to be carrying weapons or other forbidden material, news services reported.

“We were made aware of the allegations that the Alaed was carrying munitions destined for Syria, which would be a clear breach of our club rule,” Standard Club said in a statement. “We consequently informed the ship owner that their insurance cover ceased automatically in view of the nature of the voyage.”

The ship then changed course and was set to return to Russia, its cargo intact, Hague said.

The Obama administration accused Russia a week ago of planning to supply new attack helicopters to Syria, which for more than a year has been brutally suppressing a popular revolt against Assad’s rule. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton later backtracked, saying the helicopters in question were Syrian-owned and had merely been in Russia for routine repairs.

Russia, one of Syria’s strongest allies, has refused to join U.S.-led attempts to pressure Assad to honor a U.N.-brokered cease-fire with the rebels.

On Monday, President Obama used a one-on-one meeting with Russian President Vladi­mir Putin at the Group of 20 summit to urge Putin to help force Assad and his ruling Baath party out of power. But Putin made no commitments.

“We agreed that we need to see a cessation of the violence,” Obama said in brief remarks to reporters after the meeting. Obama called the bloodshed “horrific” and said he and Putin agreed to work with the United Nations, mediator Kofi Annan and other “international actors” to find a resolution.

The Russian president agreed with Obama that a “political process” must be established in Syria to prepare for a democratic government, even though he did not directly address Assad’s future, White House aides said.

Although Obama emphasized that Assad must go, Putin pursued “a bigger discussion,” said Michael McFaul, the U.S. ambassador to Russia.”

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Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
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To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

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FACT SHEET: New Executive Order Targeting Foreign Sanctions Evaders

May 2, 2012

U.S. Department of the Treasury on May 1, 2012 released the following:

“WASHINGTON – Today the President signed an Executive Order (E.O.), “Prohibiting Certain Transactions with and Suspending Entry into the United States of Foreign Sanctions Evaders with Respect to Iran and Syria,” providing the U.S. Treasury Department with a new authority to tighten further the U.S. sanctions on Iran and Syria.

This E.O. targets foreign individuals and entities that have violated, attempted to violate, conspired to violate, or caused a violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran or Syria, or that have facilitated deceptive transactions for persons subject to U.S. sanctions concerning Syria or Iran. With this new authority, Treasury now has the capability to publicly identify foreign individuals and entities that have engaged in these evasive and deceptive activities, and generally bar access to the U.S. financial and commercial systems.

“The foreign sanctions evaders E.O. provides Treasury additional means to impose serious consequences on foreign persons who seek to evade our sanctions and undermine international efforts to bring pressure to bear on the Iranian and Syrian regimes. Whoever tries to evade our sanctions does so at the expense of the people of Syria and Iran, and they will be held accountable,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen.

Upon Treasury’s identification and listing of a foreign sanctions evader, U.S. persons will generally be prohibited from providing to, or procuring from, the sanctioned party goods, services, or technology, effectively cutting the evader off from the U.S. marketplace. This provides Treasury with a powerful new tool to prevent, deter, and respond to the risks posed by sanctions evaders to the U.S. and global financial system. It also will help prevent U.S. persons from unwittingly engaging in transactions with foreign individuals and entities that pose a particular risk of running afoul of U.S. sanctions concerning Iran or Syria.

The foreign sanctions evaders E.O. is the latest in a broad-based and escalating series of steps taken by the United States and its international partners targeting the governments of Iran and Syria with respect to their abuse of human rights, support for terrorism, and proliferation and development of weapons of mass destruction. The foreign sanctions evaders E.O. follows by one week the Executive Order Blocking The Property And Suspending Entry into the United States of Certain Persons with Respect to Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria via Information Technology (the “GHRAVITY E.O.”), which targeted the provision and use of information and communications technology to facilitate computer or network disruption, monitoring, or tracking that could assist in or enable serious human rights abuses by or on behalf of the Government of Iran or the Government of Syria.

The United States has already blocked (i.e., frozen) property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its agencies and instrumentalities, and all Iranian financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Iran. In all, the Treasury Department has announced over 400 Iran-related designations and identifications of individuals and entities supporting various illicit actions of the Government of Iran, including human rights abuses, support for terrorism, and WMD proliferation. For more information, please see http://www.treasury.gov/ofac.

Similarly, the Administration has blocked the property and interests in property of the Government of Syria and its agencies and instrumentalities, including the Central Bank of Syria. The Treasury Department also has designated major Syrian financial institutions, including the Commercial Bank of Syria. In all, the Treasury Department has designated more than 60 individuals and entities supporting Syria’s human rights abuses and other repressive policies. For more information, please see http://www.treasury.gov/ofac.”

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Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

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————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

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White House expands reach of sanctions on Syria, Iran

May 1, 2012

Miami Herald on May 1, 2012 released the following:

“BY KEVIN G. HALL
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS
WASHINGTON — The Obama administration on Tuesday granted the Treasury Department authority to blacklist foreign nationals and companies that help Iran and Syria evade U.S. and international sanctions.

President Barack Obama signed an executive order and notified congressional leaders that he had given Treasury expanded powers to thwart the evasion of U.S. sanctions. These powers give the accused little chance of seeing the evidence against them, but they don’t run afoul of constitutional due-process rights since they apply to foreign entities.

“I have determined that efforts by foreign persons to engage in activities intended to evade U.S. economic and financial sanctions with respect to Iran and Syria undermine our efforts,” the president said in a letter to House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev.

The administration hopes that the ever-tightening financial sanctions will force Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions and the Syrian government to end its oppression of rebels who seek to oust it.

The new executive order allows Treasury to prohibit accused foreign nationals or companies from traveling to the United States and permits the agency to forbid U.S. companies to deal with them.

Treasury and its Office of Foreign Assets Control already have similar powers to lock companies or individuals out of the U.S. banking system, thus effectively shutting them out of the global system. Tuesday’s action was aimed at smaller companies that are helping Iran and Syria skirt the sanctions.

“Both countries are seeking to use non-bank financial institutions,” said a senior Treasury official, who briefed reporters on the condition of anonymity in order to speak freely. The official cited currency exchange houses or trading firms that don’t have a U.S. presence and fly under the radar in assisting Iran and Syria.

The agency didn’t sanction anyone with the announcement Tuesday.

“That will come in due course,” the official said. He added that foreign companies that are abetting Syria and Iran are “put on clear notice that the United States government has a new tool at its disposal to disrupt that activity.”

The official described the new measure as “more nimble and agile.” He said it targeted entities that were “in the cracks out there, where they are not engaged in behavior that would rise to the level of a (prior) designation, but are not readily susceptible to an enforcement action … because they have no U.S. presence.”

Tuesday’s announcement followed months of increasing financial pressure on Iran, including a move in March by the European Union to prevent dozens of Iranian banks from accessing the international system through which banks transfer money electronically. Treasury also has sanctioned most of the leaders of the Iranian banking, shipping and military sectors, as well as most of the family members of Syrian dictator Bashar Assad and his political allies.

For those accused under the new executive order, there won’t be the sorts of due process protections that U.S. citizens or companies are afforded. Treasury officials will share only unclassified information with the accused, meaning they will often be unable to see the information that’s leading to their accusal.

As with the financial provisions of the controversial Patriot Act, the accused can challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act, which covers not the content of the allegation but rather the process. A federal judge, however, would have access to the classified portions of the case should the accused seek legal redress.

“There is certainly a lot of room for abuse,” said Ilya Shapiro, a senior fellow in constitutional studies at the Cato Institute, a libertarian research center in Washington.

Foreign entities, he said, have fewer rights under the U.S. Constitution, and there’s little chance that the accused will sway courts to force the U.S. government to share details.

“The way the modern courts interpret administration law, they give a wide berth to government agencies. … This seems to be more an issue of policy than constitutional,” Shapiro said.”

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Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

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OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

————————————————————–

International criminal questions, but want to be anonymous?

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Obama announces sanctions for tech used in human rights abuses in Iran and Syria

April 23, 2012

Washington Post on April 23, 2012 released the following:

“President Obama issued an executive order Monday that allows U.S. officials for the first time to impose sanctions against foreign nationals found to have used new technologies, including cellphone tracking and Internet monitoring, to help carry out grave human rights abuses.

Social media and cellphone technology have been widely credited with helping democracy advocates organize against autocratic governments and better expose rights violations, most notably over the past year and a half in the Middle East and North Africa.

But authoritarian governments, particularly in Syria and Iran, have shown that their security services can also harness technology to help crack down on dissent — by conducting surveillance, blocking access to the Internet or tracking the movements of opposition figures.

Obama’s executive order, which he announced during a Monday speech at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, is an acknowledgment of those dangers and of the need to adapt American national security policy to a world being remade rapidly by technology, according to senior administration officials familiar with the plans. Although the order is designed to target companies and individuals assisting the governments of Iran and Syria, they said, future executive orders could name others aiding other countries through technology in crackdowns on dissent.

Under the order, the administration announced new sanctions, including a U.S. visa ban and financial restrictions, against a range of Syrian and Iranian agencies and individuals.

In Syria, the sanctions target the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate, the Syriatel phone company and Ali Mamluk, the director of Syria’s general intelligence services. In Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Datak Telecom will be subject to the new sanctions.

Speaking in solemn tones, Obama described the challenges of fulfilling the “never again” pledge in the 21st century, telling the audience, “We must tell our children about a crime unique in human history: the one and only Holocaust. … We must tell them how they died, but also how they lived.”

But, he added, “remembrance without action changes nothing.”

“In that sense, ‘never again’ is a challenge to us all,” he said.

Obama’s speech at the most visible U.S. symbol of Holocaust remembrance comes at a time when his policy toward Syria, where a government crackdown has killed thousands of civilians, is under sharp criticism from his Republican rivals for the presidency.

To demonstrate the priority he places on genocide prevention, Obama used the roughly 20-minute address to reveal that he has asked for the first-ever National Intelligence Estimate — the consensus view of all U.S. intelligence agencies — appraising the potential for mass killings in countries around the world and their implication for U.S. interests.

The president also announced a set of U.S. development “challenge” grants designed to encourage technology companies to develop new ways to help residents in countries vulnerable to mass killings better detect and quickly alert others to impending dangers. And he will unveil a high-level government panel to serve as a clearinghouse for real-time intelligence, policymaking and other issues related to mass killing.

“This unprecedented direction from the president, and the development of a comprehensive strategy, sends a clear message that we are committed to combating atrocities, an old threat that regularly takes grim and modern new forms,” said Samantha Power, the National Security Council’s senior director for multilateral affairs and human rights, who will serve as chairman of the Atrocities Prevention Board. The panel’s creation was announced in August.

Last year, Obama cited an imminent threat to Libya’s civilians to explain his decision to intervene militarily against longtime leader Moammar Gaddafi.

“To brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader and ­— more profoundly — our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have been a betrayal of who we are,” he said at the time.

In October, Obama dispatched 100 U.S. troops to Uganda and its neighbors to help the region’s governments hunt down Joseph Kony, the fanatical head of the Lord’s Resistance Army, notorious for its campaign of civilian slaughter and child kidnapping.

But Republicans and some human rights advocates have derided Obama’s policy in Syria as weak and pressed him to do more to stop the killings there.

Last week, echoing Obama’s own remarks on Libya delivered a year earlier, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) said that “for the United States to sit by and watch this wanton massacre is a betrayal of everything that we stand for and believe in.”

Obama has called for the removal of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and imposed a set of economic sanctions against his government. But Assad has ignored international pressure and kept up a brutal crackdown that human rights groups estimate has killed more than 11,000 people.

In some cases, Syrian security forces are using technology to track down the opposition movement’s leaders. Syrian officials may also have tracked satellite phones and computer addresses to locate a group of foreign journalists in February who were covering the siege of the city of Homs.

Two journalists were killed in an attack on a building where they were seeking shelter from government bombardment, among them Marie Colvin, an American working for the Sunday Times of London.

In his new executive order, Obama states that “the same GPS, satellite communications, mobile phone, and Internet technology employed by democracy activists across the Middle East and North Africa is being used against them by the regimes in Syria and Iran.”

The new steps are designed primarily to target companies explicitly aiding authoritarian governments with new technology that assists in civilian repression.

But senior administration officials say the measures should prompt all companies to think harder about how the technology they are providing to other countries might be employed and to take steps to ensure that it is not used in harmful ways.

“These technologies should be in place to empower citizens, not oppress them,” Obama said.

Obama’s visit to the memorial followed by a few days the official Holocaust Remembrance Day, and he used the first part of his speech to discuss the mass killing of Jews in Europe.

He recalled his visit to Buchenwald in June 2009, touring the former Nazi concentration camp on a still afternoon with Nobel Peace laureate and Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel. Wiesel also accompanied him Monday at the museum, and in his remarks, Obama thanked him and all Holocaust survivors for “not giving up.”

“If you can believe,” he said, “then we can believe.”

Obama used the second part of his remarks to discuss the legacy of Rwanda and his efforts in Libya, Sudan and central Africa, Ivory Coast and other places where mass killings or the threat of them have drawn U.S. attention.

The new Atrocities Prevention Board is intended to elevate the issue further in his administration, officials say. It will comprise senior representatives from across the administration with the goal of helping “the U.S. government identify and address atrocity threats and oversee institutional changes that will make us more nimble and effective.”

The board will hold its first session Monday afternoon and plans to meet with as many as 200 representatives of the nongovernmental organizations, university chapters of anti-genocide groups and others involved in the issue.

“This is not an afterthought, this is not a sidelight of our foreign policy,” Obama said.“We’re going to institutionalize the focus on this issue.””

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Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition and OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.


[NPWMD], [IRGC], [IRAN-HR], [SYRIA], [SDGT], and [HRIT] Entries Changed and [HRIT] Entries Added to OFAC’s SDN List on April 23, 2012

April 23, 2012

Today, OFAC has changed [NPWMD], [IRGC], [IRAN-HR], [SYRIA], [SDGT], and [HRIT] Entries and added [HRIT] Entries on the Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN List):

The following [NPWMD][IRGC][IRAN-HR][HRIT] entries have been changed on OFAC’s SDN list:

AGIR (a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] -to- AGIR (a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELABE ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] -to- IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELABE ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

IRG (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] -to- IRG (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELABE ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

IRGC (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARANE ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] -to- IRGC (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELABE ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] -to- ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELABE ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELABE ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] -to- ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELABE ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

PASDARAN (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] -toPASDARAN (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] -toPASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

PASDARAN-E INQILAB (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELABE ISLAMI; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] -to PASDARAN-E INQILAB (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELABE ISLAMI; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

REVOLUTIONARY GUARD (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELABE ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] -toREVOLUTIONARY GUARD (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELABE ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELABE ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] -toREVOLUTIONARY GUARDS (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELABE ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

SEPAH (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] -to- SEPAH (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

SEPAH PASDARAN (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] -to- SEPAH PASDARAN (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] -to- SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELABE ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] -to- THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] -to- THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS (a.k.a. AGIR; a.k.a. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. IRG; a.k.a. IRGC; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY CORPS; a.k.a. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS; a.k.a. PASDARAN; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E ENGHELABE ISLAMI; a.k.a. PASDARAN-E INQILAB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS; a.k.a. SEPAH; a.k.a. SEPAH PASDARAN; a.k.a. SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E ESLAMI; a.k.a. THE ARMY OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

The following [SYRIA][HRIT] entries have been changed on OFAC’s SDN list:

IDERAT AL-AMN AL-‘AMM (a.k.a. SYRIAN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE), Syria [SYRIA] -to- IDERAT AL-AMN AL-‘AMM (a.k.a. SYRIAN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE), Syria [SYRIA] [HRIT]

MAMLUK, ‘Ali (a.k.a. MAMLUK, Ali); DOB 1947; POB Amara, Damascus, Syria; Major General; Position: Director, General Intelligence Directorate (individual) [SYRIA] -to- MAMLUK, ‘Ali (a.k.a. MAMLUK, Ali); DOB 1947; POB Amara, Damascus, Syria; Major General; Position: Director, General Intelligence Directorate (individual) [SYRIA] [HRIT]

MAMLUK, Ali (a.k.a. MAMLUK, ‘Ali); DOB 1947; POB Amara, Damascus, Syria; Major General; Position: Director, General Intelligence Directorate (individual) [SYRIA] -to- MAMLUK, Ali (a.k.a. MAMLUK, ‘Ali); DOB 1947; POB Amara, Damascus, Syria; Major General; Position: Director, General Intelligence Directorate (individual) [SYRIA] [HRIT]

SYRIAN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (a.k.a. IDERAT AL-AMN AL-‘AMM), Syria [SYRIA] -to- SYRIAN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (a.k.a. IDERAT AL-AMN AL-‘AMM), Syria [SYRIA] [HRIT]

SYRIATEL (a.k.a. SYRIATEL MOBILE; a.k.a. SYRIATEL MOBILE TELECOM; a.k.a. SYRIATEL MOBILE TELECOM SA), Doctors Syndicate Building, Al Jalaa Street, Abu Roumaneh Area, PO Box 2900, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA] -to- SYRIATEL (a.k.a. SYRIATEL MOBILE; a.k.a. SYRIATEL MOBILE TELECOM; a.k.a. SYRIATEL MOBILE TELECOM SA), Doctors Syndicate Building, Al Jalaa Street, Abu Roumaneh Area, PO Box 2900, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA] [HRIT]

SYRIATEL MOBILE (a.k.a. SYRIATEL; a.k.a. SYRIATEL MOBILE TELECOM; a.k.a. SYRIATEL MOBILE TELECOM SA), Doctors Syndicate Building, Al Jalaa Street, Abu Roumaneh Area, PO Box 2900, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA] -to- SYRIATEL MOBILE (a.k.a. SYRIATEL; a.k.a. SYRIATEL MOBILE TELECOM; a.k.a. SYRIATEL MOBILE TELECOM SA), Doctors Syndicate Building, Al Jalaa Street, Abu Roumaneh Area, PO Box 2900, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA] [HRIT]

SYRIATEL MOBILE TELECOM (a.k.a. SYRIATEL; a.k.a. SYRIATEL MOBILE; a.k.a. SYRIATEL MOBILE TELECOM SA), Doctors Syndicate Building, Al Jalaa Street, Abu Roumaneh Area, PO Box 2900, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA] -to- SYRIATEL MOBILE TELECOM (a.k.a. SYRIATEL; a.k.a. SYRIATEL MOBILE; a.k.a. SYRIATEL MOBILE TELECOM SA), Doctors Syndicate Building, Al Jalaa Street, Abu Roumaneh Area, PO Box 2900, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA] [HRIT]

SYRIATEL MOBILE TELECOM SA (a.k.a. SYRIATEL; a.k.a. SYRIATEL MOBILE; a.k.a. SYRIATEL MOBILE TELECOM), Doctors Syndicate Building, Al Jalaa Street, Abu Roumaneh Area, PO Box 2900, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA] -to- SYRIATEL MOBILE TELECOM SA (a.k.a. SYRIATEL; a.k.a. SYRIATEL MOBILE; a.k.a. SYRIATEL MOBILE TELECOM), Doctors Syndicate Building, Al Jalaa Street, Abu Roumaneh Area, PO Box 2900, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA] [HRIT]

The following [SDGT][SYRIA][IRAN-HR][HRIT] entries have been changed on OFAC’s SDN list:

IRANIAN MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (a.k.a. VEZARAT-E ETTELA’AT VA AMNIAT-E KESHVAR; a.k.a. “MOIS”; a.k.a. “VEVAK”), bounded roughly by Sanati Street on the west, 30th Street on the south, and Iraqi Street on the east, Tehran, Iran; Ministry of Intelligence, Second Negarestan Street, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran [SDGT] [SYRIA] [IRAN-HR] -to- IRANIAN MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (a.k.a. VEZARAT-E ETTELA’AT VA AMNIAT-E KESHVAR; a.k.a. “MOIS”; a.k.a. “VEVAK”), bounded roughly by Sanati Street on the west, 30th Street on the south, and Iraqi Street on the east, Tehran, Iran; Ministry of Intelligence, Second Negarestan Street, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran [SDGT] [SYRIA] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

MOIS (a.k.a. IRANIAN MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY; a.k.a. VEZARAT-E ETTELA’AT VA AMNIAT-E KESHVAR; a.k.a. “VEVAK”), bounded roughly by Sanati Street on the west, 30th Street on the south, and Iraqi Street on the east, Tehran, Iran; Ministry of Intelligence, Second Negarestan Street, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran [SDGT] [SYRIA] [IRAN-HR] -to- MOIS (a.k.a. IRANIAN MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY; a.k.a. VEZARAT-E ETTELA’AT VA AMNIAT-E KESHVAR; a.k.a. “VEVAK”), bounded roughly by Sanati Street on the west, 30th Street on the south, and Iraqi Street on the east, Tehran, Iran; Ministry of Intelligence, Second Negarestan Street, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran [SDGT] [SYRIA] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

VEVAK (a.k.a. IRANIAN MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY; a.k.a. VEZARAT-E ETTELA’AT VA AMNIAT-E KESHVAR; a.k.a. “MOIS”), bounded roughly by Sanati Street on the west, 30th Street on the south, and Iraqi Street on the east, Tehran, Iran; Ministry of Intelligence, Second Negarestan Street, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran [SDGT] [SYRIA] [IRAN-HR] -to- VEVAK (a.k.a. IRANIAN MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY; a.k.a. VEZARAT-E ETTELA’AT VA AMNIAT-E KESHVAR; a.k.a. “MOIS”), bounded roughly by Sanati Street on the west, 30th Street on the south, and Iraqi Street on the east, Tehran, Iran; Ministry of Intelligence, Second Negarestan Street, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran [SDGT] [SYRIA] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

VEZARAT-E ETTELA’AT VA AMNIAT-E KESHVAR (a.k.a. IRANIAN MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY; a.k.a. “MOIS”; a.k.a. “VEVAK”), bounded roughly by Sanati Street on the west, 30th Street on the south, and Iraqi Street on the east, Tehran, Iran; Ministry of Intelligence, Second Negarestan Street, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran [SDGT] [SYRIA] [IRAN-HR] -to- VEZARAT-E ETTELA’AT VA AMNIAT-E KESHVAR (a.k.a. IRANIAN MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY; a.k.a. “MOIS”; a.k.a. “VEVAK”), bounded roughly by Sanati Street on the west, 30th Street on the south, and Iraqi Street on the east, Tehran, Iran; Ministry of Intelligence, Second Negarestan Street, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran [SDGT] [SYRIA] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

The following [SYRIA][IRAN-HR][HRIT] entries have been changed on OFAC’s SDN list:

IRANIAN POLICE (a.k.a. IRAN’S LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES; a.k.a. LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN; a.k.a. NAJA; a.k.a. NIRUYIH INTIZAMIYEH JUMHURIYIH ISLAMIYIH IRAN) [SYRIA] [IRAN-HR] -to IRANIAN POLICE (a.k.a. IRAN’S LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES; a.k.a. LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN; a.k.a. NAJA; a.k.a. NIRUYIH INTIZAMIYEH JUMHURIYIH ISLAMIYIH IRAN) [SYRIA] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

IRAN’S LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES (a.k.a. IRANIAN POLICE; a.k.a. LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN; a.k.a. NAJA; a.k.a. NIRUYIH INTIZAMIYEH JUMHURIYIH ISLAMIYIH IRAN) [SYRIA] [IRAN-HR] -to- IRAN’S LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES (a.k.a. IRANIAN POLICE; a.k.a. LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN; a.k.a. NAJA; a.k.a. NIRUYIH INTIZAMIYEH JUMHURIYIH ISLAMIYIH IRAN) [SYRIA] [IRANHR] [HRIT]

LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (a.k.a. IRANIAN POLICE; a.k.a. IRAN’S LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES; a.k.a. NAJA; a.k.a. NIRUYIH INTIZAMIYEH JUMHURIYIH ISLAMIYIH IRAN) [SYRIA] [IRAN-HR] -to- LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (a.k.a. IRANIAN POLICE; a.k.a. IRAN’S LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES; a.k.a. NAJA; a.k.a. NIRUYIH INTIZAMIYEH JUMHURIYIH ISLAMIYIH IRAN) [SYRIA] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

NAJA (a.k.a. IRANIAN POLICE; a.k.a. IRAN’S LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES; a.k.a. LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN; a.k.a. NIRUYIH INTIZAMIYEH JUMHURIYIH ISLAMIYIH IRAN) [SYRIA] [IRAN-HR] -to- NAJA (a.k.a. IRANIAN POLICE; a.k.a. IRAN’S LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES; a.k.a. LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN; a.k.a. NIRUYIH INTIZAMIYEH JUMHURIYIH ISLAMIYIH IRAN) [SYRIA] [IRANHR] [HRIT]

NIRUYIH INTIZAMIYEH JUMHURIYIH ISLAMIYIH IRAN (a.k.a. IRANIAN POLICE; a.k.a. IRAN’S LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES; a.k.a. LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN; a.k.a. NAJA) [SYRIA] [IRAN-HR] -to- NIRUYIH INTIZAMIYEH JUMHURIYIH ISLAMIYIH IRAN (a.k.a. IRANIAN POLICE; a.k.a. IRAN’S LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES; a.k.a. LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN; a.k.a. NAJA) [SYRIA] [IRAN-HR] [HRIT]

The following [HRIT] entries have been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

DATAK TELECOM, No. 14, Enbe E Yamin Street, North Sohrevardi Ave., Tehran, Iran [HRIT]

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Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition and OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.


Impact of Iran Sanctions Widens

April 4, 2012

The New York Times on April 4, 2012 released the following:

“By RICK GLADSTONE

The Iran sanctions effort led by the United States appeared to be causing new fractures in the Iranian economy on Tuesday, with leading oil companies in South Africa and Greece suspending imports of Iran’s crude oil, further signs of emergency self-reliance emerging in Iran, and an influential former Iranian president publicly challenging his country’s anti-American stoicism.

The latest signs of economic distress came as new questions arose about the date and location for resumed talks between Iran and the so-called P5-plus 1 countries — the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany — over Iran’s uranium enrichment activities. Iran contends the activities are peaceful but its adversaries suspect they are a cover to develop the capability to make nuclear weapons.

The talks, suspended more than a year ago, are supposed to resume in less than two weeks, but a host country has not been finalized, and Iranian news reports have suggested that the April 13 date may be changed.

On Wednesday, the Iraqi foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, told Reuters that a visiting Iranian delegation had suggested Baghdad as a venue, despite earlier indications from senior Iranian officials that they favored Istanbul — the venue of the last, failed talks on the nuclear issue in January 2011.

“The proposal came from them,” Mr. Zebari said, referring to the Iranians.

Mr. Zebari said he would discuss the idea with the ambassadors of the countries involved — the United States, Russia, China, France and Britain in addition to Germany — and would hand over a letter to them. Any further delay in resuming talks would almost certainly lead to Western charges that Tehran is playing for time while its scientists press ahead with uranium enrichment.

While Istanbul once seemed a middle ground between Iran and the outside powers, relations between Turkey and Iran have cooled because of Ankara’s alignment with nations pressing Syria — Iran’s closest regional ally — to end its bloody crackdown on dissent and open a political transition.

The maneuvers in advance of the proposed talks have been accompanied by a tightening array of sanctions aimed at stopping Tehran’s uranium enrichment. But Iran had called the measures a bullying tactic by the West that is doomed to fail. At the same time, Iranian leaders have acknowledged that the sanctions are causing deprivations in the country by severely restricting international financial transactions and sales of crude oil, Iran’s main export. The European Union will tighten the sanctions further starting July 1 with an embargo of Iranian crude oil.

In South Africa, Engen Petroleum, which has been South Africa’s biggest buyer of Iranian oil and is a leading marketer and refiner of petroleum products throughout southern Africa, said Tuesday it was no longer Iran’s customer. “Engen has suspended imports from Iran and our contingency sources are in play,” a company spokeswoman, Tania Landsberg, said in an email, confirming press reports of Engen’s decision.

South Africa, which historically has relied on Iran for a quarter of its imports, had been sending mixed messages regarding Western pressure to reduce Iranian purchases, with recent data suggesting that the country has been buying more crude oil from Iran this year. Engen’s decision to buy elsewhere suggested that the Western pressure was working.

In Greece, Hellenic Petroleum, the country’s leading refiner, also suspended purchases of Iranian crude oil — not because of the impending European Union embargo, but because banking payments to Iran have been rendered unworkable by the financial sanctions already in place, Reuters reported.

Those financial sanctions, including the recent expulsion of Iran’s central bank from a global financial communications network, have reverberated through Iran’s economy, most notably contributing to a sharp drop in the value of Iran’s currency, the rial, against the dollar. The pressure on the currency, which has caused the price of imported goods to soar in Iran, was an underlying theme in a New Year’s message by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, strongly urging Iranians to buy only goods made in Iran.

In what appeared to be a step toward enforcing the ayatollah’s exhortation, Iranian trade authorities have now banned 600 imported items. The ban, reported by Sharq, a reformist Iranian newspaper, did not specify the items but quoted Hamid Safdel, director of Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization, as saying Iranian manufacturers also make those items, rendering the imports unnecessary.

While Iranian leaders have presented a unified front of hostility to the sanctions, a disagreement surfaced on Tuesday, when Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president who is now the chairman of the Expediency Council, an advisory panel to the supreme leader, suggested that Iran had erred by failing to befriend Saudi Arabia, the Middle East’s leading oil producer.

The Saudis, who are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslims and harbor wariness toward the Shiite majority in Iran, have pledged to increase their exports to compensate for any supply shortfall caused by the Iranian oil embargo. Saudi cooperation is crucial to the West’s strategy.

“If we had good relations with Saudi Arabia, would the West have been able to impose sanctions?” Mr. Rafsanjani said in the quarterly International Studies Journal, as translated by Agence France-Presse.

Mr. Rafsanjani, whose stature as a pragmatic force in Iranian politics diminished in recent years but now seems to be reviving, also reiterated his longstanding suggestion that Iran restore diplomatic relations with the United States, estranged since the 1979 revolution. His view is directly at odds with that of Ayatollah Khamenei, who appears to see any conciliatory gesture as a sign of weakness.

“”The meaning of negotiation is not that we submit to them,” Mr. Rafsanjani wrote in what seemed a rejoinder to the ayatollah. “We negotiate, and if they accept our positions or we accept theirs, then it is done.””

————————————————————–

Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition and OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.


[SYRIA] and [IRAQ2] Entries Added to OFAC’s SDN List on March 30, 2012

March 30, 2012

Today, OFAC has added [SYRIA] and [IRAQ2] Entries to the Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN List):

The following [SYRIA][IRAQ2] entries have been changed on OFAC’s SDN list:

AL-HEMMEH, Thu (a.k.a. AL-SHALISH, Dhu AlHimma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Dhu Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Thu Al Hima; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhu Al Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhuil Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhayr; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhilma), Damascus, Syria; DOB circa 1956; POB lLadhiqiyah, Syria; nationality Syria; General; Has a military position- is known also as Major General or Brigadier General. (individual) [IRAQ2] -to- AL-HEMMEH, Thu (a.k.a. ALSHALISH, Dhu Al-Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Dhu Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Thu Al Hima; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhu Al Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhuil Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhayr; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhilma), Damascus, Syria; DOB circa 1956; POB Al-Ladhiqiyah, Syria; nationality Syria; Brigadier General; Major General (individual) [SYRIA] [IRAQ2]

AL-SHALISH, Dhu Al-Himma (a.k.a. ALHEMMEH, Thu; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Dhu Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Thu Al Hima; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhu Al Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhuil Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhayr; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhilma), Damascus, Syria; DOB circa 1956; POB Al-Ladhiqiyah, Syria; nationality Syria; General; Has a military position- is known also as Major General or Brigadier General. (individual) [IRAQ2] -to- AL-SHALISH, Dhu AlHimma (a.k.a. AL-HEMMEH, Thu; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Dhu Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Thu Al Hima; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhu Al Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhuil Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhayr; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhilma), Damascus, Syria; DOB circa 1956; POB Al-Ladhiqiyah, Syria; nationality Syria; Brigadier General; Major General (individual) [SYRIA] [IRAQ2]

SHALEESH, Dhu Himma (a.k.a. AL-HEMMEH, Thu; a.k.a. AL-SHALISH, Dhu Al-Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Thu Al Hima; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhu Al Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhuil Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhayr; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhilma), Damascus, Syria; DOB circa 1956; POB AlLadhiqiyah, Syria; nationality Syria; General; Has a military position- is known also as Major General or Brigadier General. (individual) [IRAQ2] -to- SHALEESH, Dhu Himma (a.k.a. ALHEMMEH, Thu; a.k.a. AL-SHALISH, Dhu AlHimma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Thu Al Hima; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhu Al Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhuil Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhayr; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhilma), Damascus, Syria; DOB circa 1956; POB Al-Ladhiqiyah, Syria; nationality Syria; Brigadier General; Major General (individual) [SYRIA] [IRAQ2]

SHALEESH, Thu Al Hima (a.k.a. AL-HEMMEH, Thu; a.k.a. AL-SHALISH, Dhu Al-Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Dhu Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhu Al Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhuil Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhayr; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhilma), Damascus, Syria; DOB circa 1956; POB AlLadhiqiyah, Syria; nationality Syria; General; Has a military position- is known also as Major General or Brigadier General. (individual) [IRAQ2] -to- SHALEESH, Thu Al Hima (a.k.a. AL-HEMMEH, Thu; a.k.a. AL-SHALISH, Dhu AlHimma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Dhu Himma; a.k.a.
SHALISH, Dhu Al Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhuil Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhayr; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhilma), Damascus, Syria; DOB circa 1956; POB Al-Ladhiqiyah, Syria; nationality Syria; Brigadier General; Major General (individual) [SYRIA] [IRAQ2]

SHALISH, Dhu Al Himma (a.k.a. AL-HEMMEH, Thu; a.k.a. AL-SHALISH, Dhu Al-Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Dhu Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Thu Al Hima; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhuil Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhayr; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhilma), Damascus, Syria; DOB circa 1956; POB Al-Ladhiqiyah, Syria; nationality Syria; General; Has a military position- is known also as Major General or Brigadier General. (individual) [IRAQ2] -to- SHALISH, Dhu Al Himma (a.k.a. AL-HEMMEH, Thu; a.k.a. AL-SHALISH, Dhu AlHimma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Dhu Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Thu Al Hima; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhuil Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhayr; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhilma), Damascus, Syria; DOB circa 1956; POB Al-Ladhiqiyah, Syria; nationality Syria; Brigadier General; Major General (individual) [SYRIA] [IRAQ2]

SHALISH, Dhuil Himma (a.k.a. AL-HEMMEH, Thu; a.k.a. AL-SHALISH, Dhu Al-Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Dhu Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Thu Al Hima; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhu Al Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhayr; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhilma), Damascus, Syria; DOB circa 1956; POB Al-Ladhiqiyah, Syria; nationality Syria; General; Has a military position- is known also as Major General or Brigadier General. (individual) [IRAQ2] -to- SHALISH, Dhuil Himma (a.k.a. ALHEMMEH, Thu; a.k.a. AL-SHALISH, Dhu AlHimma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Dhu Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Thu Al Hima; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhu Al Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhayr; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhilma), Damascus, Syria; DOB circa 1956; POB Al-Ladhiqiyah, Syria; nationality Syria; Brigadier General; Major General (individual) [SYRIA] [IRAQ2]

SHALISH, Zuhayr (a.k.a. AL-HEMMEH, Thu; a.k.a. AL-SHALISH, Dhu Al-Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Dhu Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Thu Al Hima; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhu Al Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhuil Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhilma), Damascus, Syria; DOB circa 1956; POB Al-Ladhiqiyah, Syria; nationality Syria; General; Has a military position- is known also as Major General or Brigadier General. (individual) [IRAQ2] -to- SHALISH, Zuhayr (a.k.a. ALHEMMEH, Thu; a.k.a. AL-SHALISH, Dhu AlHimma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Dhu Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Thu Al Hima; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhu Al Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhuil Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhilma), Damascus, Syria; DOB circa 1956; POB Al-Ladhiqiyah, Syria; nationality Syria; Brigadier General; Major General (individual) [SYRIA] [IRAQ2]

SHALISH, Zuhilma (a.k.a. AL-HEMMEH, Thu; a.k.a. AL-SHALISH, Dhu Al-Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Dhu Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Thu Al Hima; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhu Al Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhuil Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhayr), Damascus, Syria; DOB circa 1956; POB Al-Ladhiqiyah, Syria; nationality Syria; General; Has a military position- is known also as Major General or Brigadier General. (individual) [IRAQ2] -to- SHALISH, Zuhilma (a.k.a. ALHEMMEH, Thu; a.k.a. AL-SHALISH, Dhu AlHimma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Dhu Himma; a.k.a. SHALEESH, Thu Al Hima; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhu Al Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Dhuil Himma; a.k.a. SHALISH, Zuhayr), Damascus, Syria; DOB circa 1956; POB Al-Ladhiqiyah, Syria; nationality Syria; Brigadier General; Major General (individual) [SYRIA] [IRAQ2]

The following [SYRIA] entries have been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

ADANOF, Munir (a.k.a. ADANOV, Munir; a.k.a. ADNUF, Munir); DOB 1951; Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Syrian Army; Lieutenant General (individual) [SYRIA]

ADANOV, Munir (a.k.a. ADANOF, Munir; a.k.a. ADNUF, Munir); DOB 1951; Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Syrian Army; Lieutenant General (individual) [SYRIA]

ADNUF, Munir (a.k.a. ADANOF, Munir; a.k.a. ADANOV, Munir); DOB 1951; Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Syrian Army; Lieutenant General (individual) [SYRIA]

RAJHA, Daood (a.k.a. RAJHA, Davoud; a.k.a. RAJHA, Dawood; a.k.a. RAJHA, Dawoud; a.k.a. RAJIHA, Dawood; a.k.a. RAJIHA, Dawood Abdukllah; a.k.a. RAJIHAH, Dawud); DOB 1947; POB Damascus, Syria; Minister of Defense; General (individual) [SYRIA]

RAJHA, Davoud (a.k.a. RAJHA, Daood; a.k.a. RAJHA, Dawood; a.k.a. RAJHA, Dawoud; a.k.a. RAJIHA, Dawood; a.k.a. RAJIHA, Dawood Abdukllah; a.k.a. RAJIHAH, Dawud); DOB 1947; POB Damascus, Syria; Minister of Defense; General (individual) [SYRIA]

RAJHA, Dawood (a.k.a. RAJHA, Daood; a.k.a. RAJHA, Davoud; a.k.a. RAJHA, Dawoud; a.k.a. RAJIHA, Dawood; a.k.a. RAJIHA, Dawood Abdukllah; a.k.a. RAJIHAH, Dawud); DOB 1947; POB Damascus, Syria; Minister of Defense; General (individual) [SYRIA]

RAJHA, Dawoud (a.k.a. RAJHA, Daood; a.k.a. RAJHA, Davoud; a.k.a. RAJHA, Dawood; a.k.a. RAJIHA, Dawood; a.k.a. RAJIHA, Dawood Abdukllah; a.k.a. RAJIHAH, Dawud); DOB 1947; POB Damascus, Syria; Minister of Defense; General (individual) [SYRIA]

RAJIHA, Dawood (a.k.a. RAJHA, Daood; a.k.a. RAJHA, Davoud; a.k.a. RAJHA, Dawood; a.k.a. RAJHA, Dawoud; a.k.a. RAJIHA, Dawood Abdukllah; a.k.a. RAJIHAH, Dawud); DOB 1947; POB Damascus, Syria; Minister of Defense; General (individual) [SYRIA]

RAJIHA, Dawood Abdukllah (a.k.a. RAJHA, Daood; a.k.a. RAJHA, Davoud; a.k.a. RAJHA, Dawood; a.k.a. RAJHA, Dawoud; a.k.a. RAJIHA, Dawood; a.k.a. RAJIHAH, Dawud); DOB 1947; POB Damascus, Syria; Minister of Defense; General (individual) [SYRIA]

RAJIHAH, Dawud (a.k.a. RAJHA, Daood; a.k.a. RAJHA, Davoud; a.k.a. RAJHA, Dawood; a.k.a. RAJHA, Dawoud; a.k.a. RAJIHA, Dawood; a.k.a. RAJIHA, Dawood Abdukllah); DOB 1947; POB Damascus, Syria; Minister of Defense; General (individual) [SYRIA]

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Treasury Designates Syrian Government Officials

3/30/2012

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the designations of three senior officials of the Government of Syria – Syria’s Minister of Defense Dawood Rajiha, Syria’s Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army Munir Adanov and Syria’s Head of Presidential Security Zuhayr Shalish – pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13573.

The Syrian regime’s continued use of violence against its people has imposed a devastating toll on Syria. Through today’s action, the United States reinforces its commitment to stand with the Syrian people, and it also sends a strong message to the Syrian armed forces and all Syrian officials that the international community is bearing witness to the regime’s brutality. The United States will continue to work with our partners around the world to ensure that the Syrian regime and its senior officials are held accountable for the continued repression in Syria.

“The U.S. and the international community will hold to account those who stand with the Asad regime as it trains the instruments of war against Syrian civilians. The time has long since passed for Syrian officials at all levels to turn their backs on this bloody regime,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen.

Signed by President Obama on May 18, 2011, E.O. 13573 targets those determined to be senior officials of the Government of Syria. U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with any of the designees and any assets they may have subject to U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.

Designated Individuals:

Dawood Rajiha

Dawood Rajiha was appointed Minister of Defense on August 10, 2011 and was reportedly chosen for his loyalty to the Asad regime.

Munir Adanov

Munir Adanov has served as Syria’s Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army since at least July 2010 and has accompanied President Asad on several high-level official visits abroad. Adanov was sanctioned by the European Union in August 2011, for his direct involvement in “repression and violence against the civilian population in Syria.”

Zuhayr Shalish

As Syria’s Head of Presidential Security, Zuhayr Shalish has served as Bashar Asad’s personal bodyguard. In July 2011, Shalish, a relative of Bashar Asad, was sanctioned by the European Union for his involvement in “violence against demonstrators.”

Identifying Information:

Individual: RAJIHA, DAWOOD

AKA: RAJIHA, DAWOOD ABDUKLLAH

AKA: RAJHA, DAOOD

AKA: RAJIHAH, DAWUD

AKA: RAJHA, DAVOUD

AKA: RAJHA, DAWOOD

AKA: RAJHA, DAWOUD

DOB: 1947

POB: Damascus, Syria

Rank: General

Title: Minister of Defense

Individual: ADANOV, MUNIR

AKA: ADANOF, MUNIR

AKA: ADNUF, MUNIR

DOB: 1951

Rank: Lieutenant General

Title: Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Syrian Arab Army

Individual: SHALISH, ZUHAYR

AKA: AL-HEMMEH, THU

AKA: AL-SHALISH DHU AL-HIMMEH

AKA: SHALEESH, DHU HIMMA

AKA: SHALEESH, THU AL HIMA

AKA: SHALISH, DHU AL HIMMA

AKA: SHALISH, DHUIL HIMMA

AKA: SHALISH, ZUHILMA

DOB: circa 1956

POB: Al-Ladhiqiyah, Syria

Rank: Major General

Alt. Rank: Brigadier General”

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Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

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OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

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To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition and OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.


Top Sanctions Official Says Pace To Continue

March 19, 2012

The Wall Street Journal on March 19, 2012 released the following:

“By Samuel Rubenfeld

The pace of sanctions announcements will continue, a top Obama administration official said.

Adam Szubin, director of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, said Monday at a conference of anti-money laundering industry officials that Iran and Syria will be the focus as the year goes on, with emphasis on the international dimensions on key measures.

He said OFAC is also looking at legislation emerging from Congress on Iran and Syria, and how the office would implement it.

Szubin’s remarks opened the 17th Annual International Anti-Money Laundering Conference in Hollywood, Fla.

He said the practice by financial institutions of “stripping data and routing transactions on behalf of sanctioned parties” has mostly abated, saying that is a result of a slew of enforcement actions and because the industry decided doing it isn’t consistent with best practices.

“This is not to say there won’t be any more cases announced because we take this conduct very seriously and where we have cases we will pursue them, but the issue is mostly closed,” Szubin said.

Reviewing the past 16 months of sanctions, Szubin said a month hasn’t gone by when OFAC hasn’t make a major announcement such as expanding regulations, or implementing and dismantling an entire sanctions program, as the office did on Libya.

He said the Libya program, which found $30 billion in a matter of hours, was among the most gratifying things he’s ever done.”

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Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition and OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal.

The author of this blog is Douglas McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.


Treasury Sanctions Syrian State Media

March 5, 2012

The Wall Street Journal on March 5, 2012 released the following:

“By Samuel Rubenfeld

The U.S. Treasury Department said Monday it identified the Syrian General Organization of Radio and TV as subject to sanctions imposed on the country’s government.

The organization is a state-run agency subordinate to the information ministry; it operates Syria’s state-owned TV channels and the government’s radio stations, Treasury said in a statement.

It was identified as being subject to sanctions imposed on entities of the Syrian government, regardless of whether they’re specifically identified by Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. The identification, Treasury said, is simply to aid with compliance with the executive order imposing the sanctions.

“The General Organization of Radio and TV has served as an arm of the Syrian regime as it mounts increasingly barbaric attacks on its own population and seeks both to mask and legitimize its violence,” said Adam Szubin, director of OFAC, in the statement.

Monday’s identification comes less than a week after the United Nations said the death toll in the nearly year-long crackdown by the Syrian regime on the opposition reached more than 7,500.

The Syrian regime has used state entities “to repress and attack civilians” in a way that “has imposed a devastating toll on the people of Syria,” Treasury said in the statement.”

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Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition and OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal.

The author of this blog is Douglas McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.


Syria [SYRIA] Entries Added to OFAC’s SDN List on March 5, 2012

March 5, 2012

Today, OFAC has added [SYRIA] Entries to the Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN List):

The following [SYRIA] entries have been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF RADIO AND TV (a.k.a. GENERAL RADIO AND TELEVISION CORPORATION; a.k.a. RADIO AND TELEVISION CORPORATION; a.k.a. RTV SYRIA; a.k.a. SYRIAN DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF RADIO & TELEVISION EST; a.k.a. “GORT”), Al Oumaween Square, P.O. Box 250, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA]

GENERAL RADIO AND TELEVISION CORPORATION (a.k.a. GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF RADIO AND TV; a.k.a. RADIO AND TELEVISION CORPORATION; a.k.a. RTV SYRIA; a.k.a. SYRIAN DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF RADIO & TELEVISION EST; a.k.a. “GORT”), Al Oumaween Square, P.O. Box 250, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA]

GORT (a.k.a. GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF RADIO AND TV; a.k.a. GENERAL RADIO AND TELEVISION CORPORATION; a.k.a. RADIO AND TELEVISION CORPORATION; a.k.a. RTV SYRIA; a.k.a. SYRIAN DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF RADIO & TELEVISION EST), Al Oumaween Square, P.O. Box 250, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA]

RADIO AND TELEVISION CORPORATION (a.k.a. GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF RADIO AND TV; a.k.a. GENERAL RADIO AND TELEVISION CORPORATION; a.k.a. RTV SYRIA; a.k.a. SYRIAN DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF RADIO & TELEVISION EST; a.k.a. “GORT”), Al Oumaween Square, P.O. Box 250, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA]

RTV SYRIA (a.k.a. GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF RADIO AND TV; a.k.a. GENERAL RADIO AND TELEVISION CORPORATION; a.k.a. RADIO AND TELEVISION CORPORATION; a.k.a. SYRIAN DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF RADIO & TELEVISION EST; a.k.a. “GORT”), Al Oumaween Square, P.O. Box 250, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA]

SYRIAN DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF RADIO & TELEVISION EST (a.k.a. GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF RADIO AND TV; a.k.a. GENERAL RADIO AND TELEVISION CORPORATION; a.k.a. RADIO AND TELEVISION CORPORATION; a.k.a. RTV SYRIA; a.k.a. “GORT”), Al Oumaween Square, P.O. Box 250, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA]

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Treasury Identifies Syrian General Organization of Radio and TV as Subject to Sanctions

3/5/2012

Targets Main Syrian Broadcasters Supporting Violent Crackdown

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today identified the Syrian General Organization of Radio and TV as subject to sanctions imposed on the Government of Syria in Executive Order (E.O.) 13582 of August 17, 2011.

E.O. 13582 blocks all property and interests in property of the Government of Syria, which includes its agencies, instrumentalities and controlled entities, within U.S. jurisdiction, whether specifically identified by OFAC or not. U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in business with any Syrian state-owned entity. Today’s identification is intended to aid compliance with E.O. 13582.

The General Organization of Radio and TV is a state-run agency subordinate to Syria’s Ministry of Information. It is responsible for operating Syria’s state-owned television channels, two terrestrial and one satellite, as well as the government radio stations.

The Syrian regime’s use of state entities to repress and attack civilians has imposed a devastating toll on the people of Syria. The United States has consistently stood against this abuse and has taken strong steps to target the regime’s ability to act against the Syrian people.

“The General Organization of Radio and TV has served as an arm of the Syrian regime as it mounts increasingly barbaric attacks on its own population and seeks both to mask and legitimize its violence. By taking this action today, Treasury is sending a clear signal that it stands with the Syrian people. Any individuals or institutions supporting its abhorrent behavior will be targeted and cut off from the international financial system,” said Adam Szubin, Director of Treasury’s OFAC.

U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with the Government of Syria, including the General Organization of Radio and TV, and any assets the Government of Syria may have subject to U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.

Identifying Information:

Entity: General Organization of Radio and TV

A.K.A.: Syrian Directorate General of Radio & Television Est

A.K.A.: General Radio and Television Corporation

A.K.A.: Radio and Television Corporation

A.K.A.: GORT

Address:

Al Oumaween Square
P.O. Box 250
Damascus, Syria

Phone:
(963 11) 223 4930″

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Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

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OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition and OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal.

The author of this blog is Douglas McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.