“U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Those Aiding Iran”

May 10, 2013

The New York Times on May 9, 2013 released the following:

By RICK GLADSTONE

“The United States on Thursday expanded its roster of those violating Iran sanctions, blacklisting four Iranian companies and one individual suspected of helping the country enrich nuclear fuel. It also singled out two other companies, including a Venezuelan-Iranian bank, accused of helping Iran evade other Western-imposed prohibitions on oil sales and financial dealings.

The penalties announced by the Treasury and State Departments came a day after the Senate introduced legislation that could effectively deny the Iran government access to an estimated $100 billion worth of its own money parked in overseas banks, a step that proponents said could significantly damage Iran’s financial stability.

That legislation, known as the Iran Sanctions Loophole Elimination Act, is expected to be integrated into a broader House measure introduced in February.

The actions on Thursday appeared to signal an accelerated American effort to squeeze Iran economically over the lack of progress in negotiations on the disputed Iranian nuclear program, which Iran says is peaceful but the West has called a guise to achieve the ability to make atomic bombs.

The latest round of negotiations last month ended inconclusively, and Western critics of Iran have accused it of stalling for time while it continues to enrich uranium.

“With Iran’s nuclear program marching steadily forward, we need to work as quickly as possible to eliminate any sources of funding for the regime,” the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Ed Royce, a California Republican, said in a statement issued jointly with the ranking Democrat, Representative Eliot Engel of New York.

They said the committee would hold a hearing Wednesday on Iran’s nuclear activities.

Any assets that blacklisted companies or individuals may have under American jurisdiction can be frozen, and they are prohibited from doing business with American citizens or businesses. Other individuals or business that engage with those under sanctions are themselves subject to penalties.

Iran has characterized the sanctions as illegal bullying by the United States and its allies. Some critics of the sanctions have said they are more likely to harden Iran’s resistance.

A State Department announcement said four Tehran-based businesses, identified as Aluminat, Pars Amayesh Sanaat Kish, Pishro Systems Research Company and Taghtiran Kashan Company, and an Iranian citizen from Tehran identified as Parviz Khaki, were all blacklisted for providing goods, technology and services for activities that violated United Nations Security Council sanctions on Iran’s nuclear activities.

“This action was taken in light of the ongoing concerns that the international community has with respect to Iran’s nuclear program, which Iran continues to refuse to address,” the State Department announcement said.

In what appeared to be a coordinated announcement, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, which helps administer sanctions, announced that it was punishing Sambouk Shipping FZC, based in the United Arab Emirates, for cloaking the origin of Iranian oil and selling it on the international market. The Treasury said that the company was owned by a Greek business executive, Dmitris Cambis, who was blacklisted earlier this year for ties to sanctioned Iranian companies.

In addition, the Treasury penalized the Iranian Venezuelan Bi-National Bank, based in Tehran, for engaging in financial transactions for the Export Development Bank of Iran, which has already been blacklisted.

“As Iran becomes increasingly isolated from the international financial system and energy markets, it is turning increasingly to convoluted schemes and shady actors to maintain its access to the global financial system,” David S. Cohen, the under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, said in the Treasury announcement. “As long as Iran tries to evade our sanctions, we will continue to expose their deceptive maneuvers.””

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Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

————————————————————–

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OFAC: “Iran Sanctions Designations; Non-Proliferation Sanctions Designations; Iran Sanctions Designations Updates”

May 9, 2013

The U.S. Department of the Treasury on May 9, 2013 released the following:

“OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Specially Designated Nationals Update

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

KHAKI, Parviz (a.k.a. “MARTIN”); DOB 26 Aug 1968; POB Tehran, Iran (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

ALUMINAT (a.k.a. ALUMINAT PRODUCTION AND INDUSTRIAL COMPANY), Unit 38, 5th Floor, No. 9, Golfam Avenue, Africa Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Factory-Kilometer 13, Arak Road, Parcham Street, Arak, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR].

IRANIAN-VENEZUELAN BI-NATIONAL BANK (a.k.a. “IVBB”), Tosee Building Ground Floor, Bokharest Street 44-46, Tehran, Iran; SWIFT/BIC IVBBIRT1; all offices worldwide [NPWMD] [IFSR].

PARS AMAYESH SANAAT KISH (a.k.a. PASK; a.k.a. VACUUM KARAN; a.k.a. VACUUM KARAN CO.; a.k.a. VACUUMKARAN), 3rd Floor, No. 6, East 2nd, North Kheradmand, Karimkhan Street, Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR].

PISHRO SYSTEMS RESEARCH COMPANY (a.k.a. ADVANCED SYSTEMS RESEARCH COMPANY; a.k.a. ASRC; a.k.a. CENTER FOR ADVANCED SYSTEMS RESEARCH; a.k.a. CRAS; a.k.a. PISHRO COMPANY), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR].

SAMBOUK SHIPPING FZC, FITCO Building No. 3, Office 101, 1st Floor, P.O. Box 50044, Fujairah, United Arab Emirates; Office 1202, Crystal Plaza, PO Box 50044, Buhaira Corniche, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates [IRAN] (Linked To: CAMBIS, Dimitris).

TAGHTIRAN KASHAN COMPANY (a.k.a. TAGHTIRAN P.J.S.), Flat 2, No. 3, 2nd Street, Azad-Abadi Avenue, Tehran 14316, Iran; KM 44 Kashan-Delijan Road, P.O. Box Kashan 87135/1987, Kashan, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR].

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

ATLANTIS (5IM316) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag (NITC); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569621 (vessel) [IRAN].

BADR (EQJU) Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8407345 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

DEMOS (5IM656) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag (NITC); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569683 (vessel) [IRAN].

INFINITY (5IM411) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag (NITC); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569671 (vessel) [IRAN].

JUSTICE Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357729 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

SKYLINE (5IM632) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag (NITC); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569669 (vessel) [IRAN].

SUNRISE LPG Tanker None Identified flag (NITC); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9615092 (vessel) [IRAN].

YOUNES (EQYY) Platform Supply Ship Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8212465 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

ALPHA (f.k.a. ABADAN) (T2EU4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187629; MMSI 572469210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SHONA (f.k.a. ABADAN; f.k.a. ALPHA) (T2EU4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag None Identified; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187629; MMSI 572469210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

AZALEA (f.k.a. SINA) (9HNY9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357365; MMSI 249256000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SUNEAST (f.k.a. AZALEA; f.k.a. SINA) (9HNY9) Crude Oil Tanker Seychelles flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag None Identified; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357365; MMSI 249256000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

DAMAVAND (9HEG9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218478; MMSI 256865000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DAMAVAND (9HEG9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218478; MMSI 256865000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

DARAB (9HEE9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218492; MMSI 256862000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DARAB (9HEE9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218492; MMSI 256862000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

DAYLAM (9HEU9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218466; MMSI 256872000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DAYLAM (9HEU9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218466; MMSI 256872000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

DELVAR (9HEF9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218454; MMSI 256864000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DELVAR (9HEF9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218454; MMSI 256864000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

DENA (9HED9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218480; MMSI 256861000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DENA (9HED9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218480; MMSI 256861000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

HUWAYZEH (9HEJ9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212888; MMSI 256869000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- HUWAYZEH (9HEJ9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212888; MMSI 256869000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).”

————————————————————–

Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

————————————————————–

International criminal defense questions, but want to be anonymous?

Free Skype Tel: +1.202.470.3427, OR

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Nuclear ruse: Posing as toymaker, Chinese merchant allegedly sought U.S. technology for Iran

August 13, 2012

The Washington Post on August 11, 2012 released the following:

“By Joby Warrick

The Chinese toymaker said he was seeking parts for a “magic horse,” a metal-framed playground pony. But the exotic, wildly expensive raw material he wanted seemed better suited for space travel than backyard play.

His shopping list, sent by e-mail to a Seattle factory, started with 20 tons of maraging steel, an ultra-strong alloy often used in rockets. The buyer didn’t flinch at the price tag — $2 million — but he repeatedly insisted on secrecy. “This material,” an associate confided in an e-mail, “are danger [sic] goods.”

Only in recent months did the full scope of the ruse become apparent. The destination for the specialty steel was not China but Iran, and the order had nothing to do with toy horses, U.S. investigators say.

“We are certain,” said a law enforcement official familiar with the case, “that the metal was meant for advanced centrifuges in Iran’s nuclear program.”

Last month, the Justice Department announced indictments against two people, one Chinese and the other Iranian, for conspiring to acquire maraging steel and other restricted American technology. U.S. officials say the case is part of a broader effort by Iran to dramatically expand its capacity to enrich uranium — with Chinese firms serving as willing accomplices.

The United States and its European allies have imposed ­ever-escalating sanctions intended to cut off Iran from sensitive technology and restricted material required for its nuclear program and to reduce its access to the global oil market. The goal is to stop Iran’s progress toward what the West believes is a nuclear arsenal, even as Iran maintains that its nuclear efforts are strictly part of a civilian energy program.

Maraging steel is a critical material in a new, highly efficient centrifuge that Iran has struggled for years to build. Barred by sanctions from buying the alloy legally, Iranian nuclear officials have sought to secretly acquire it from Western companies. In recent years, U.S. officials say, an increasing number of Chinese merchants have volunteered to help, serving as middlemen in elaborate schemes to obtain the steel and other forbidden material for Iran’s uranium enrichment plants as well as its missiles factories.

“They are not just stumbling on opportunities,” said Steve Pelak, the Justice Department’s counterespionage chief. “They are professional, studied procurement agents and shippers. They know precisely what business they’re in and how to go after it.”

The Seattle case is at least the fourth in the past two years in which companies based in China have been accused of helping Iran try to purchase sensitive technology. Although Iran has used Chinese go-betweens in the past, U.S. officials said sanctions have forced the isolated and besieged Iranian government to rely increasingly on China for economic help and access to restricted goods.

A senior Justice Department official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss ongoing investigations, said, “As some countries have retreated from the Iranian market with the imposition of increased sanctions, many Chinese companies appear to have moved into the void.”

Although the Obama administration has praised China for reducing its imports of Iranian oil in recent months, bilateral trade between Tehran and Beijing surged in the previous decade, from $2.5 billion in 2000 to $29.3 billion in 2010. The increase has softened the impact of international sanctions, U.S. officials and independent analysts say.

With the latest case, however, U.S. warnings about Iranian-­Chinese collusion have gained new urgency. If Iran can buy enough maraging steel on the black market, it can build more-efficient centrifuges, which will enrich uranium much faster than the machines it now uses.

“It is a major bottleneck in Iran’s production,” said David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector and author of a new study on Iranian procurement of nuclear technology. While Iran appears to have the know-how to make better centrifuges, the shortage of high-strength materials demanded by the new version — particularly maraging steel and carbon fiber — has prevented its scientists from producing more than a few hundred for testing, he said.

Officially, the Chinese government opposes a nuclear-armed Iran, and U.S. officials say Beijing has been a helpful ally during recent international negotiations aimed at pressuring the government to scale back its nuclear program. In addition, there is no evidence that China has provided nuclear assistance to Iran directly since the early 1990s.

Yet, despite repeated U.S. protests, Chinese businessmen continue to offer crucial assistance to Iran’s procurement efforts without fear of punishment or censure, U.S. officials and nuclear experts say.

An unusual order

Perhaps the most striking fact about the toy-horse plot, investigators say, is that it was discovered at all. The tip came in late 2008 from an obscure Homeland Security program that involves occasional factory visits by U.S. officials to guard against foreign pilfering of sensitive U.S. technology.

During a visit to a Puget Sound steelmaker, an export manager there told a U.S. official about a bizarre query he had gotten from China.

“It was a gigantic order: 20 tons of maraging steel,” recalled a law enforcement official familiar with the case.

The mention of maraging steel raised eyebrows because of the alloy’s use in missiles and centrifuges. Months passed with no follow-up to the initial inquiry from the prospective buyer, and efforts by U.S. officials to investigate the unusual order reached a dead end.

In the spring of 2009, a new query from China turned up in the steelmaker’s inbox. This time, the buyer claimed to represent a toy company, Monalila Co., a maker of playground equipment. The company Web site showed photographs of real toys, including its premier product, Model HF450, the “Magic Horse.”

“No gas, no battery, no power, but can be ride [sic] as a horse and run smoothly on squares, parks, alleys and any other flat grounds,” read the product description, displayed beneath a photo of a black-and-white toy pony with a saddle and cottony mane.

To make its ponies, the company needed the bulk order of maraging steel, wrote the purchasing agent, who identified himself as “Yi.” Except for the names and products, the $2 million order was identical to the one from the previous year.

U.S. investigators were alerted, and they set up a sting. In a chain of e-mails, federal agents posing as salesmen teased out details about the order and who was behind it. Eventually Yi excused himself and handed over the correspondence to his boss, a man he called “Martin.” It quickly became apparent that Martin was not Chinese and had no interest in toys.

“We were able to determine that Martin’s e-mail originated in Iran,” said the law-enforcement official familiar with the case.

Over the following months the shopping list grew, as the Iranian, with increasing boldness, piled on requests — other specialty metals used in uranium enrichment, an array of machines and instruments with known nuclear applications, even a mass spectrometer specifically calibrated to measure uranium fluorine gas, a key part of the enrichment process.

Investigators determined Martin’s real identity — Parviz Khaki. As part of the subterfuge, they confronted him about the possibility that the materials would be shipped illegally to Iran. Khaki did not appear to care, Justice Department officials said in an indictment handed down last month around the time of the man’s arrest.

“Khaki discussed his motivation to make money from this transaction,” the indictment stated.

On July 13, authorities in the Philippines arrested Khaki as he was boarding a plane in Manila. He had been indicted by a U.S. grand jury on charges of running a $30 million scheme to acquire banned U.S. technology for Iran. His alleged Chinese associate, Zongcheng Yi, was also indicted. Khaki remains in custody in Manila. Yi’s whereabouts are unknown.

Persistent flow of material

Khaki’s alleged plan to ship maraging steel to Iran through China was stopped, but federal officials concluded that the network delivered other nuclear-related components and tools to Tehran. Among them were corrosion-resistant nickel alloy and special lathes to manufacture centrifuge parts.

U.S. officials say the items are among several million dollars’ worth of material and parts — from missile components to electronics for roadside bombs — that have passed through China to Iran in the past five years. The flow of Western technology to Tehran is so persistent that it has emerged as an irritant in relations between Beijing and Washington, prompting the Obama administration to dispatch two delegations to Beijing since 2010 to complain.

Chinese officials have made occasional arrests but say they can’t always know of every attempt by a Chinese entrepreneur to make a profit by helping Iran shop for technology. But given the stakes, current and former U.S. officials and Iran experts continue to press Beijing to do more.”

————————————————————–

Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

————————————————————–

International criminal defense questions, but want to be anonymous?

Free Skype Tel: +1.202.470.3427, OR

Free Skype call:

           Office Locations

Email: