U.S. Department of the Treasury: “Government of Iran Listings”

September 9, 2013

The U.S. Department of the Treasury on September 6, 2013 released the following:

“OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
Specially Designated Nationals List Update

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

MOHADDES, Seyed Mahmoud; DOB 07 Jun 1957; citizen Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Managing Director, Iranian Oil Company (U.K.) Ltd. (individual) [IRAN].

MOINIE, Mohammad; DOB 04 Jan 1956; POB Brojerd, Iran; citizen United Kingdom; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport 301762718 (United Kingdom); Commercial Director, Naftiran Intertrade Company Sarl (individual) [IRAN].

PARSAEI, Reza; DOB 09 Aug 1963; citizen Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Director, NIOC International Affairs (London) Ltd. (individual) [IRAN].

SEYYEDI, Seyed Nasser Mohammad; DOB 21 Apr 1963; citizen Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport B14354139 (Iran); alt. Passport L18507193 (Iran); alt. Passport X95321252 (Iran); Managing Director, Sima General Trading (individual) [IRAN].

TABATABAEI, Seyyed Mohammad Ali Khatibi; DOB 27 Sep 1955; citizen Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Director, NIOC International Affairs (London) Ltd.; Director of International Affairs, NIOC (individual) [IRAN].

ZIRACCHIAN ZADEH, Mahmoud; DOB 24 Jul 1959; citizen Iran; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Director, Iranian Oil Company (U.K.) Ltd. (individual) [IRAN].

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

AA ENERGY FZCO, United Arab Emirates; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [IRAN].

KASB INTERNATIONAL LLC, United Arab Emirates; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [IRAN].

PETRO ROYAL FZE, United Arab Emirates; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [IRAN].

SWISS MANAGEMENT SERVICES SARL, 28C, Route de Denges, Lonay 1027, Switzerland; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [IRAN].”

————————————————————–

Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

————————————————————–

International criminal defense questions, but want to be anonymous?

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The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC): “Iran Designations”

June 4, 2013

The U.S. Department of the Treasury on June 4, 2013 released the following:

“OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
Specially Designated Nationals List Update

Click here for more information about the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO) International Financial Network

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

AMIN INVESTMENT BANK (a.k.a. AMINIB), No. 51 Ghobadiyan Street, Valiasr Street, Tehran 1968917173, Iran; Website http://www.aminib.com [IRAN].

BEHSAZ KASHANE TEHRAN CONSTRUCTION CO. (a.k.a. BEHSAZ KASHANEH CO.), No. 40, East Street Journal, North Shiraz Street, Sadra Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Website http://www.behsazco.ir [IRAN].

COMMERCIAL PARS OIL CO., 9th Floor, No. 346, Mirdamad Avenue, Tehran, Iran [IRAN].

CYLINDER SYSTEM L.T.D. (a.k.a. CILINDER SISTEM D.O.O.; a.k.a. CILINDER SISTEM D.O.O. ZA PROIZVODNJU I USLUGE), Dr. Mile Budaka 1, Slavonski Brod 35000, Croatia; 1 Mile Budaka, Slavonski Brod 35000, Croatia; Website http://www.csc-sb.hr; Registration ID 050038884 (Croatia); Tax ID No. 27694384517 (Croatia) [IRAN].

EXECUTION OF IMAM KHOMEINI’S ORDER (a.k.a. EIKO; a.k.a. SETAD; a.k.a. SETAD EJRAEI EMAM; a.k.a. SETAD-E EJRAEI-E FARMAN-E HAZRAT-E EMAM; a.k.a. SETAD-E FARMAN-EJRAEI-YE EMAM), Khaled Stamboli St., Tehran, Iran [IRAN].

GHADIR INVESTMENT COMPANY, 341 West Mirdamad Boulevard, Tehran, Iran; P.O. Box 19696, Tehran, Iran; Website http://www.ghadir-invest.com [IRAN].

GHAED BASSIR PETROCHEMICAL PRODUCTS COMPANY (a.k.a. GHAED BASSIR), No. 15, Palizvani (7th) Street, Gandhi (South) Avenue, Tehran 1517655711, Iran; Km 10 of Khomayen Road, Golpayegan, Iran; Website http://www.gbpc.net [IRAN].

GOLDEN RESOURCES TRADING COMPANY L.L.C. (a.k.a. “GRTC”), 9th Floor, Office No. 905, Khalid Al Attar Tower 1, Sheikh Zayed Road, After Crown Plaza Hotel, Al Wasl Area, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Postal Box 34489, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Postal Box 14358, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [IRAN].

HORMOZ OIL REFINING COMPANY, Next to the Current Bandar Abbas Refinery, Bandar Abbas City, Iran [IRAN].

IRAN & SHARGH COMPANY (a.k.a. IRAN AND EAST COMPANY; a.k.a. IRAN AND SHARGH COMPANY; a.k.a. IRANOSHARGH COMPANY; a.k.a. SHERKAT-E IRAN VA SHARGH), 827, North of Seyedkhandan Bridge, Shariati Street, P.O. Box 13185-1445, Tehran 16616, Iran; No. 41, Next to 23rd Alley, South Gandi St., Vanak Square, Tehran 15179, Iran; Website http://www.iranoshargh.com [IRAN].

IRAN & SHARGH LEASING COMPANY (a.k.a. IRAN AND EAST LEASING COMPANY; a.k.a. IRAN AND SHARGH LEASING COMPANY; a.k.a. SHERKAT-E LIZING-E IRAN VA SHARGH), 1st Floor, No. 33, Shahid Atefi Alley, Opposite Mellat Park, Vali-e-Asr Street, Tehran 1967933759, Iran; Website http://www.isleasingco.com [IRAN].

MARJAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY (a.k.a. MARJAN METHANOL COMPANY), Ground Floor, No. 39, Meftah/Garmsar West Alley, Shiraz (South) Street, Molla Sadra Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Post Office Box 19935-561, Tehran, Iran [IRAN].

MCS ENGINEERING (a.k.a. EFFICIENT PROVIDER SERVICES GMBH), Karlstrasse 21, Dinslaken, Nordrhein-Westfalen 46535, Germany [IRAN].

MCS INTERNATIONAL GMBH (a.k.a. MANNESMAN CYLINDER SYSTEMS; a.k.a. MCS TECHNOLOGIES GMBH), Karlstrasse 23-25, Dinslaken, Nordrhein-Westfalen 46535, Germany; Website http://www.mcs-tch.com [IRAN].

MELLAT INSURANCE COMPANY, No. 48, Haghani Street, Vanak Square, Before Jahan-Kodak Cross, Tehran 1517973913, Iran; No. 40, Shahid Haghani Express Way, Vanak Square, Tehran, Iran; No. 9, Niloofar Street, Sharabyani Avenue, Taavon Boulevard, Shahr-e-Ziba, Tehran, Iran; 72 Hillview Court, Woking, Surrey GU22 7QW, United Kingdom; No. 697 Saeeidi Alley, Crossroads College, Enghelab St., Tehran, Iran; Website http://www.mellatinsurance.com [IRAN].

MODABER (a.k.a. MODABER INVESTMENT COMPANY; a.k.a. TADBIR INDUSTRIAL HOLDING COMPANY) [IRAN].

OIL INDUSTRY INVESTMENT COMPANY (a.k.a. “O.I.I.C.”), No. 83, Sepahbod Gharani Street, Tehran, Iran; Website http://www.oiic-ir.com [IRAN].

OMID REY CIVIL & CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (a.k.a. OMID DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION; a.k.a. OMID REY CIVIL AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; a.k.a. OMID REY RENOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT CO.); Website http://www.omidrey.com [IRAN].

ONE CLASS PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD. (a.k.a. ONE CLASS INCORPORATED), Cape Town, South Africa [IRAN].

ONE VISION INVESTMENTS 5 (PTY) LTD. (a.k.a. ONE VISION 5), 3rd Floor, Tygervalley Chambers, Bellville, Cape Town 7530, South Africa; Canal Walk, P.O. Box 17, Century City, Milnerton 7446, South Africa; Registration ID 2002/022757/07 (South Africa) [IRAN].

PARDIS INVESTMENT COMPANY (a.k.a. SHERKAT-E SARMAYEGOZARI-E PARDIS), Iran; Unit D4 and C4, 4th Floor, Building 29 Africa, Corner of 25th Street, Africa Boulevard, Tehran, Iran [IRAN].

PARS MCS (a.k.a. PARS MCS CO.; a.k.a. PARS MCS COMPANY), 2nd Floor, No. 4, Sasan Dead End, Afriqa Avenue, After Esfandiar, Crossroads, Tehran, Iran; No. 5 Sasan Alley, Atefi Sharghi St., Afrigha Boulevard, Tehran, Iran; Oshtorjan Industrial Zone, Zob-e Ahan Highway, Isafahan, Iran; Website http://www.parsmcs.com [IRAN].

PARS OIL CO. (a.k.a. PARS OIL; a.k.a. SHERKAT NAFT PARS SAHAMI AAM), Iran; No. 346, Pars Oil Company Building, Modarres Highway, East Mirdamad Boulevard, Tehran 1549944511, Iran; Postal Box 14155-1473, Tehran 159944511, Iran; Website http://www.parsoilco.com [IRAN].

PERSIA OIL & GAS INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT CO. (a.k.a. PERSIA OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT CO.; a.k.a. TOSE SANAT-E NAFT VA GAS PERSIA), 7th Floor, No. 346, Mirdamad Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Ground Floor, No. 14, Saba Street, Africa Boulevard, Tehran, Iran; Website http://www.pogidc.com [IRAN].

POLYNAR COMPANY, No. 58, St. 14, Qanbarzadeh Avenue, Resalat Highway, Tehran, Iran; Website http://www.polynar.com [IRAN].

REY INVESTMENT COMPANY, 2nd and 3rd Floors, No. 14, Saba Boulevard, After Esfandiar Crossroad, Africa Boulevard, Tehran 1918973657, Iran; Website http://www.rey-co.com [IRAN].

REY NIRU ENGINEERING COMPANY (a.k.a. REY NIROO ENGINEERING COMPANY); Website http://www.reyniroo.com [IRAN].

REYCO GMBH. (a.k.a. REYCO GMBH GERMANY), Karlstrasse 19, Dinslaken, Nordrhein-Westfalen 46535, Germany [IRAN].

RISHMAK PRODUCTIVE & EXPORTS COMPANY (a.k.a. RISHMAK COMPANY; a.k.a. RISHMAK EXPORT AND MANUFACTURING P.J.S.; a.k.a. RISHMAK PRODUCTION AND EXPORT COMPANY; a.k.a. RISHMAK PRODUCTIVE AND EXPORTS COMPANY; a.k.a. SHERKAT-E TOLID VA SADERAT-E RISHMAK), Rishmak Cross Rd., 3rd Km. of Amir Kabir Road, Shiraz 71365, Iran [IRAN].

ROYAL ARYA CO. (a.k.a. ARIA ROYAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY), Iran [IRAN].

SADAF PETROCHEMICAL ASSALUYEH COMPANY (a.k.a. SADAF ASALUYEH CO.; a.k.a. SADAF CHEMICAL ASALUYEH COMPANY; a.k.a. SADAF PETROCHEMICAL ASSALUYEH INVESTMENT SERVICE), Assaluyeh, Iran; South Pars Special Economy/Energy Zone, Iran [IRAN].

TADBIR BROKERAGE COMPANY (a.k.a. SHERKAT-E KARGOZARI-E TADBIRGARAN-E FARDA; a.k.a. TADBIRGARAN FARDA BROKERAGE COMPANY; a.k.a. TADBIRGARAN-E FARDA BROKERAGE COMPANY; a.k.a. TADBIRGARANE FARDA MERCANTILE EXCHANGE CO.), Unit C2, 2nd Floor, Building No. 29, Corner of 25th Street, After Jahan Koudak, Cross Road Africa Street, Tehran 15179, Iran; Website http://www.tadbirbroker.com [IRAN].

TADBIR CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (a.k.a. GORUH-E TOSE-E SAKHTEMAN-E TADBIR; a.k.a. TADBIR BUILDING EXPANSION GROUP; a.k.a. TADBIR HOUSING DEVELOPMENT GROUP), Block 1, Mehr Passage, 4th Street, Iran Zamin Boulevard, Shahrak Qods, Tehran, Iran [IRAN].

TADBIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GROUP (a.k.a. TADBIR GROUP), 16 Avenue Bucharest, Tehran, Iran [IRAN].

TADBIR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT GROUP CO., 6th Floor, Mirdamad Avenue, No. 346, Tehran, Iran; Website http://www.tadbirenergy.com [IRAN].

TADBIR INVESTMENT COMPANY, Tehran, Iran [IRAN].

TOSEE EQTESAD AYANDEHSAZAN COMPANY (a.k.a. TEACO; a.k.a. TOSEE EGHTESAD AYANDEHSAZAN COMPANY), 39 Gandhi Avenue, Tehran 1517883115, Iran [IRAN].

ZARIN RAFSANJAN CEMENT COMPANY (a.k.a. RAFSANJAN CEMENT COMPANY; a.k.a. ZARRIN RAFSANJAN CEMENT COMPANY), 2nd Floor, No. 67, North Sindokht Street, West Dr. Fatemi Avenue, Tehran 1411953943, Iran; Website http://www.zarrincement.com [IRAN].”

————————————————————–

Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

————————————————————–

International criminal defense questions, but want to be anonymous?

Free Skype Tel: +1.202.470.3427, OR

Free Skype call:

           Office Locations

Email:


The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC): “Kingpin Act Designations; Foreign Sanctions Evaders Designations; Executive Order 13622 Designations; Iran Sanctions Designations; Non-proliferation Designations; Counter Terrorism Designations”

May 31, 2013

The U.S. Department of the Treasury on May 31, 2013 released the following:

“OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Specially Designated Nationals Update

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

ARABNEJAD, Hamid; DOB 16 Apr 1961; alt. DOB 03 May 1956; nationality Iran; Passport E1929795 (Iran) expires 25 May 2010; alt. Passport V08716254 (Iran) expires 15 Jul 2011; alt. Passport V11630399 (Iran) expires 20 Jun 2012; alt. Passport U8356901 (Iran) expires 09 May 2011; alt. Passport H10395121 (Iran) expires 18 Jan 2012; alt. Passport K11946257 (Iran) expires 27 Oct 2012; alt. Passport X13567677 (Iran) expires 02 Jul 2013; alt. Passport D14818825 (Iran) expires 16 Mar 2014; alt. Passport F16438158 (Iran) expires 18 Nov 2014; alt. Passport R19234531 (Iran) expires 02 Nov 2015; alt. Passport L95280222 (Iran) expires 23 Jul 2016; alt. Passport L95273714 (Iran) expires 22 Aug 2016; alt. Passport P95418009 (Iran) expires 27 Apr 2017 (individual) [SDGT] [IFSR].

KARNER, Mihael (a.k.a. TOPOLOVEC, Jozef), Locnikarijeva ulica 7, 1000, Ljubljana, Slovenia; Rozna Dolina, Cesta IV 44, Ljubljana, Slovenia; V Murglah 177, Ljubljana, Slovenia; DOB 13 Mar 1975; POB Ljubljana, Slovenia; nationality Slovenia; Passport PZ2420022110 (Slovenia); alt. Passport PB06005902 (Slovenia); Personal ID Card 00246412491303975500493 (Slovenia) expires 17 Dec 2018; alt. Personal ID Card 002464124 (Slovenia) expires 17 Dec 2018 (individual) [SDNTK].

KIM, Lidia (a.k.a. KIM, Lidia Egorovna; a.k.a. KIM, Lidiia; a.k.a. KIM, Lidiya); DOB 23 Mar 1955; citizen Kyrgyzstan; Passport 02NO133036 (Russia); alt. Passport AN1912357 (individual) [SDGT] [IFSR].

MERHEJ, Rodrigue Elias (a.k.a. MERKHEZH, Rodrig); DOB 1970; alt. DOB 1969; alt. DOB 1971; POB Lebanon (individual) [SDGT] [IFSR].

NOORZAI, Haji Kotwal (a.k.a. “KHOOTWAL, Haji”; a.k.a. “KHOTWAL, Haji”; a.k.a. “KOOTWAL, Haji”), Quetta City, Balochistan Province, Pakistan; Girdi Jangle, Balochistan Province, Pakistan; DOB 1961; alt. DOB 1960; alt. DOB 1962; alt. DOB 1958; alt. DOB 1957; alt. DOB 1959; POB Nahr-e Saraj Village, Nahr-e Saraj District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan; nationality Afghanistan (individual) [SDNTK].

SANCHEZ ARELLANO, Luis Fernando; DOB 24 Oct 1973; POB Baja California, Mexico; nationality Mexico; citizen Mexico (individual) [SDNTK].

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

BANDAR IMAM PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY, North Kargar Street, Tehran, Iran; Mahshahr, Bandar Imam, Khuzestan Province, Iran [IRAN].

BOU ALI SINA PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY (a.k.a. BUALI SINA PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY), No. 17, 1st Floor, Daman Afshar St., Vanak Sq., Vali-e-Asr Ave, Tehran 19697, Iran; Petrochemical Special Economic Zone (PETZONE), Iran [IRAN].

FERLAND COMPANY LIMITED (a.k.a. FERLAND CO. LTD), 29 A Anna Komnini St., PO Box 2303, Nicosia, Cyprus; 5/7 Sabaneyev Most., Odessa, Ukraine [ISA] [FSE-IR].

JAM PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY, Pars Special Economic Zone, Assaluyeh, Boushehr Province, Iran [EO13622].

KYRGYZ TRANS AVIA (a.k.a. KYRGYZTRANSAVIA AIRLINES), Bulvar Erkindik 35, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; 32 Razzakova Street, Bishkek 720040, Kyrgyzstan [SDGT] [IFSR].

LOS CABALLEROS TEMPLARIOS, Mexico [SDNTK].

LOS CACHIROS, Honduras [SDNTK].

LOS URABENOS (a.k.a. BANDA CRIMINAL DE URABA; a.k.a. LOS AUTODEFENSAS GAITANISTAS DE COLOMBIA), Colombia; Honduras; Panama [SDNTK].

MOBIN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY, South Pars Special Economic Energy Zone, Postal Box: 75391-418, Assaluyeh, Bushehr, Iran; PO Box, Mashhad, Iran [IRAN].

NIKSIMA FOOD AND BEVERAGE JLT, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [EO13622].

NOURI PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY (a.k.a. BORZUYEH PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY; a.k.a. NOURI PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX), Pars Special Economic Energy Zone, Assaluyeh Port, Bushehr, Iran [IRAN].

PARS PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY, Pars Special Economic Energy Zone, PO Box 163-75391, Assaluyeh, Bushehr, Iran [IRAN].

PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA (a.k.a. AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA; a.k.a. AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA, PRYVATNE AT; a.k.a. BUKOVYNA AE; a.k.a. BUKOVYNA AIRLINES; a.k.a. BUKOVYNA AVIATION ENTERPRISE), Bud.30 vul.Chkalova Pershotravnevy R-N, Chernivtsi 58009, Ukraine [NPWMD] [IFSR].

SHAHID TONDGOOYAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY (a.k.a. SHAHID TONDGUYAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY), Petrochemical Special Economic Zone (PETZONE), Iran [IRAN].

SHAZAND PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY (a.k.a. AR.P.C.; a.k.a. ARAK PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY; a.k.a. SHAZAND PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION), No. 68, Taban St., Vali Asr Ave., Tehran, Iran [IRAN].

SIRJANCO TRADING L.L.C., 17th Floor, Office 1701, Al Moosa Tower 1, Sheikh Zayed Road, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [SDGT] [IFSR].

TABRIZ PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY, Off Km 8, Azarshahr Road, Kojuvar Road, Tabriz, Iran [IRAN].

UKRAINIAN-MEDITERRANEAN AIRLINES (a.k.a. UKRAINSKE-TSCHERMOMORSKIE AVIALINII; a.k.a. UM AIR), 7 Shulyavska Street, Kiev 03055, Ukraine; Building Negin Sai Apartment 105, Valiasr Street, Tehran, Iran; 29 Ayar Street, Julia Dumna Building, Damascus, Syria; 38 Chkalova Street, building 1, office 10, Minsk, Belarus [SDGT] [IFSR].

The following aircraft have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

UR-BHJ; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2088; Aircraft Manufacture Date Jul 1994; Aircraft Model MD-83; Aircraft Operator Bukovyna AE; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 53184 (aircraft) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA).

UR-BXN; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 1405; Aircraft Manufacture Date 08 Apr 1987; Aircraft Model MD-83; Aircraft Operator Bukovyna AE; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 49569 (aircraft) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA).

UR-CIX; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2167; Aircraft Manufacture Date Nov 1996; Aircraft Model MD-88; Aircraft Operator Bukovyna AE; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 53546 (aircraft) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA).

UR-CIY; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2176; Aircraft Manufacture Date Mar 1997; Aircraft Model MD-88; Aircraft Operator Bukovyna AE; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 53547 (aircraft) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA).

UR-CJA; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 1181; Aircraft Manufacture Date 04 Jan 1985; Aircraft Model MD-82; Aircraft Operator Bukovyna AE; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 49277 (aircraft) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA).

UR-CJK; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 2180; Aircraft Manufacture Date Apr 1997; Aircraft Model MD-88; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 53548 (aircraft) [NPWMD] [IFSR] (Linked To: PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA).

UR-CJW; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 358; Aircraft Manufacture Date 12 Sep 1999; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ100; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3358 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR].

UR-CKF; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 341; Aircraft Manufacture Date 20 Dec 1998; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ100; Aircraft Operator Mahan Air; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3341 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR].

UR-CKG; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 362; Aircraft Manufacture Date 16 Nov 1999; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ100; Aircraft Operator Mahan Air; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3362 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR].

UR-CKJ; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 343; Aircraft Manufacture Date 04 Sep 1999; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ100; Aircraft Operator Mahan Air; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3343 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR].

UR-CKX; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 131; Aircraft Manufacture Date 25 May 1989; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ300; Aircraft Operator Ukrainian-Mediterranean Airlines; alt. Aircraft Operator Ukrainian-Mediterranean Airlines; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3131 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR].

UR-CKY; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 146; Aircraft Manufacture Date 08 Jan 1990; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ100; Aircraft Operator Mahan Air; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3146 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR].

UR-CKZ; Aircraft Construction Number (also called L/N or S/N or F/N) 159; Aircraft Manufacture Date 01 Jan 1990; Aircraft Model BAe-146 Avro RJ300; Aircraft Operator Ukrainian-Mediterranean Airlines; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 3159 (aircraft) [SDGT] [IFSR].”

————————————————————–

Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

————————————————————–

International criminal defense questions, but want to be anonymous?

Free Skype Tel: +1.202.470.3427, OR

Free Skype call:

           Office Locations

Email:


The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC): “Iran Human Rights Designation; Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act Designations​”

May 30, 2013

The U.S. Department of the Treasury on May 30, 2013 released the following:

“OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
Specially Designated Nationals List Update

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

MIR-HEJAZI, Asghar (a.k.a. HEJAZI, Asghar; a.k.a. HEJAZI, Asghar Sadegh; a.k.a. MIR-HEJAZI RUHANI, Ali Asqar; a.k.a. MIRHEJAZI, Ali; a.k.a. MIR-HEJAZI, Ali Asqar); DOB 08 Sep 1946; POB Esfahan, Iran; citizen Iran; Security Deputy of Supreme Leader; Member of the Leader’s Planning Chamber; Head of Security of Supreme Leader’s Office; Deputy Chief of Staff of the Supreme Leader’s Office (individual) [IRAN-HR].

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

COMMITTEE TO DETERMINE INSTANCES OF CRIMINAL CONTENT (a.k.a. COMMISSION TO DETERMINE INSTANCES OF CRIMINAL CONTENT; a.k.a. COMMITTEE FOR DETERMINING EXAMPLES OF CRIMINAL WEB CONTENT; a.k.a. COMMITTEE IN CHARGE OF DETERMINING UNAUTHORIZED WEBSITES; a.k.a. WORKING GROUP FOR DETERMINING OFFENSIVE CONTENT; a.k.a. WORKING GROUP TO DETERMINE INSTANCES OF CRIMINAL CONTENT; a.k.a. WORKING GROUP TO DETERMINE INSTANCES ON ONLINE CRIMINAL CONTENT), Sure-Esrafil St, Tehran, Iran; Website http://internet.ir [IRAN-TRA].

OFOGH SABERIN ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (a.k.a. OFOGH TOSE-EH SABERIN ENGINEERING), Shahid Malek Lu Street, No. 86, Tehran, Iran [IRAN-TRA].”

————————————————————–

Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

————————————————————–

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The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC): “Government of Iran Listings; Non-proliferation Designations; Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations Identifications”

May 29, 2013

The U.S. Department of the Treasury on May 23, 2013 released the following:

“OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
Specially Designated Nationals Update

For more information on the Seifollah Jashsaz designation please visit this link.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

BAHADORI, Masoud; nationality Iran; Passport T12828814 (Iran); Managing Director, Petro Suisse Intertrade Company (individual) [IRAN].

BAZARGAN, Farzad; DOB 03 Jun 1956; Passport D14855558 (Iran); alt. Passport Y21130717 (Iran); Managing Director, Hong Kong Intertrade Company (individual) [IRAN].

BUJAR, Farhad (a.k.a. BOUJAR, Farhad); nationality Iran; Passport R10789966; Managing Director, TESA (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].

GHALEBANI, Ahmad (a.k.a. GHALEHBANI, Ahmad; a.k.a. QALEHBANI, Ahmad); DOB 01 Jan 1953 to 31 Dec 1954; Passport H20676140 (Iran); Managing Director, National Iranian Oil Company; Director, Hong Kong Intertrade Company; Director, Petro Suisse Intertrade Company (individual) [IRAN].

JASHNSAZ, Seifollah (a.k.a. JASHN SAZ, Seifollah; a.k.a. JASHNSAZ, Seyfollah); DOB 01 Mar 1958 to 31 Mar 1958; nationality Iran; Passport R17589399 (Iran); Chairman & Director, Naftiran Intertade Co. (NICO) Sarl; Chairman & Director, Naft Iran Intertade Company Ltd.; Director, Hong Kong Intertrade Company; Chairman & Director, Petro Suisse Intertrade Compay (individual) [IRAN].

MAHDAVI, Ali; DOB 21 Apr 1967; citizen Iran (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].

MOZAFFARINIA, Reza (a.k.a. MOZAFARI-NIYA, Reza; a.k.a. MOZAFARNIA, Reza; a.k.a. MOZAFFARI NIA, Reza; a.k.a. MOZAFFARINIA HOSEIN, Reza; a.k.a. MOZAFFARI-NIA, Reza; a.k.a. MOZAFFARI-NIYA, Reza; a.k.a. MOZZAFARNIA, Dr. Reza); DOB 1959; POB Isfahan, Iran; Deputy Defense Minister and Dean of Malek Ashtar University (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].

NIKOUSOKHAN, Mahmoud; DOB 01 Jan 1961 to 31 Dec 1962; nationality Iran; Passport U14624657 (Iran); Finance Director, National Iranian Oil Company; Director, Hong Kong Intertrade Company; Director, Petro Suisse Intertrade Company (individual) [IRAN].

PARVARESH, Farhad Ali; DOB Dec 1957; nationality Iran (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].

POURANSARI, Hashem; nationality Iran; Passport B19488852 (Iran); Managing Director, Asia Energy General Trading (individual) [IRAN].

VAZIRI, Hossein Nosratollah (a.k.a. VAZIRI, Ahmad; a.k.a. VAZIRI, Ahmed), 3-C-C Impiana Condo Jalan, Ulu Klang, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; DOB 21 Mar 1961; POB Damghan, Iran; nationality Iran; Passport R19246338 (Iran) (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].

YAZDI, Bahareh Mirza Hossein (a.k.a. YAZDI, Betty); DOB 26 Jun 1978; citizen United Kingdom (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

ABAN AIR (a.k.a. ABAN AIR CO JPS), No.14, Imam Khomeini Airport, Airport Cargo Terminal, Tehran, Iran; No.1267, Vali Asr Avenue, Tehran 1517736511, Iran; Unit 7, Marlin Park, Central Way, Feltham TW14 OXD, United Kingdom; No.53 Molla Sadra St. Vanak Square, Tehran 19916 14661, Iran; No 7 & 8, Main Dnata Building, Dubai Airport Free Zone, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Website http://www.abanair.com; Email Address info@abanair.com [NPWMD] [IFSR].

ANDISHEH ZOLAL, 42 Niam Street, Shariati Avenue, P.O. Box 15875-4159, Tehran 19481, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR].

DFS WORLWIDE (a.k.a. DFS WORLDWIDE FZCO), No.53 Mollasadra Avenue, P.O. Box 1991614661, Tehran, Iran; Unit 7, Marlin Park, Central Way, Feltham, Middlesex TW14 0XD, United Kingdom; Warehouse No.J-01, Dubai Airport Free Zone, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; P.O. Box 293020 Dubai Airport Free Zone, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Cargo City South, Building 543, Frankfurt 60549, Germany; S.A. Pty Ltd Unit 8, the Meezricht Business Park, 33 Kelly Road, Jet Park, Boksburg North 1460, South Africa; Website http://www.dfsworldwide.com; Email Address irsales@dfsworldwide.com; DFS WORLWIDE, (a.k.a. DFS WORLDWIDE FZCO) is a separate and distinct entity from DFS Worldwide of Houston, Texas, USA and from Deutsche Financial Services, of Germany. [NPWMD] [IFSR].

ENERGY GLOBAL INTERNATIONAL FZE, P.O. Box 1245, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Email Address MD@energyglobal.info [NPWMD] [IFSR].

EVEREX (a.k.a. EVEREX GLOBAL CARRIER AND CARGO; a.k.a. EVEREX LIMITED; a.k.a. SUN GROUP; a.k.a. SUN GROUP AIR TRAVEL AND AIR CARGO AND AIRPORT SERVICES LTD), Office 14, Cargo Terminal, Imam Khomeini International Airport, Tehran, Iran; 1267 Vali-E-Asr Avenue, Tehran, Iran; No.53 Mollasadra St, Vanak Square, Tehran, Iran; Office# J01, Dubai Airport Free Zone, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; P.O. Box 293020, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Unit 7, Marlin Park, Central Way, Feltham TW14 OXD, United Kingdom; Website http://www.everexglobal.com; Email Address irsales@everexglobal.com; alt. Email Address uksales@everexglobal.com [NPWMD] [IFSR].

GLOBAL SEA LINE CO LTD, 10 Anson Road #31-10 International Plaza, Singapore; Email Address globalsealine@gmail.com [NPWMD] [IFSR].

PETRO GREEN (a.k.a. PETRO DIAMOND; a.k.a. PETROGREEN), B-8-1 Block B Megan Ave. II, 12 Jalan Yap Kwan Seng, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia [NPWMD] [IFSR].

ZOLAL IRAN COMPANY, No. 2 Shariati Avenue, Niyam Street, Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR].”

————————————————————–

Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

————————————————————–

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OFAC: “Iran Sanctions Designations; Non-Proliferation Sanctions Designations; Iran Sanctions Designations Updates”

May 9, 2013

The U.S. Department of the Treasury on May 9, 2013 released the following:

“OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Specially Designated Nationals Update

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

KHAKI, Parviz (a.k.a. “MARTIN”); DOB 26 Aug 1968; POB Tehran, Iran (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

ALUMINAT (a.k.a. ALUMINAT PRODUCTION AND INDUSTRIAL COMPANY), Unit 38, 5th Floor, No. 9, Golfam Avenue, Africa Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Factory-Kilometer 13, Arak Road, Parcham Street, Arak, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR].

IRANIAN-VENEZUELAN BI-NATIONAL BANK (a.k.a. “IVBB”), Tosee Building Ground Floor, Bokharest Street 44-46, Tehran, Iran; SWIFT/BIC IVBBIRT1; all offices worldwide [NPWMD] [IFSR].

PARS AMAYESH SANAAT KISH (a.k.a. PASK; a.k.a. VACUUM KARAN; a.k.a. VACUUM KARAN CO.; a.k.a. VACUUMKARAN), 3rd Floor, No. 6, East 2nd, North Kheradmand, Karimkhan Street, Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR].

PISHRO SYSTEMS RESEARCH COMPANY (a.k.a. ADVANCED SYSTEMS RESEARCH COMPANY; a.k.a. ASRC; a.k.a. CENTER FOR ADVANCED SYSTEMS RESEARCH; a.k.a. CRAS; a.k.a. PISHRO COMPANY), Tehran, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR].

SAMBOUK SHIPPING FZC, FITCO Building No. 3, Office 101, 1st Floor, P.O. Box 50044, Fujairah, United Arab Emirates; Office 1202, Crystal Plaza, PO Box 50044, Buhaira Corniche, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates [IRAN] (Linked To: CAMBIS, Dimitris).

TAGHTIRAN KASHAN COMPANY (a.k.a. TAGHTIRAN P.J.S.), Flat 2, No. 3, 2nd Street, Azad-Abadi Avenue, Tehran 14316, Iran; KM 44 Kashan-Delijan Road, P.O. Box Kashan 87135/1987, Kashan, Iran [NPWMD] [IFSR].

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

ATLANTIS (5IM316) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag (NITC); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569621 (vessel) [IRAN].

BADR (EQJU) Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8407345 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

DEMOS (5IM656) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag (NITC); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569683 (vessel) [IRAN].

INFINITY (5IM411) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag (NITC); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569671 (vessel) [IRAN].

JUSTICE Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357729 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

SKYLINE (5IM632) Crude Oil Tanker Tanzania flag (NITC); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9569669 (vessel) [IRAN].

SUNRISE LPG Tanker None Identified flag (NITC); Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9615092 (vessel) [IRAN].

YOUNES (EQYY) Platform Supply Ship Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8212465 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

ALPHA (f.k.a. ABADAN) (T2EU4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187629; MMSI 572469210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SHONA (f.k.a. ABADAN; f.k.a. ALPHA) (T2EU4) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Tanzania flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag None Identified; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9187629; MMSI 572469210 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

AZALEA (f.k.a. SINA) (9HNY9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357365; MMSI 249256000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- SUNEAST (f.k.a. AZALEA; f.k.a. SINA) (9HNY9) Crude Oil Tanker Seychelles flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; alt. Former Vessel Flag Tuvalu; alt. Former Vessel Flag None Identified; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9357365; MMSI 249256000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

DAMAVAND (9HEG9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218478; MMSI 256865000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DAMAVAND (9HEG9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218478; MMSI 256865000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

DARAB (9HEE9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218492; MMSI 256862000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DARAB (9HEE9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218492; MMSI 256862000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

DAYLAM (9HEU9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218466; MMSI 256872000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DAYLAM (9HEU9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218466; MMSI 256872000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

DELVAR (9HEF9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218454; MMSI 256864000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DELVAR (9HEF9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218454; MMSI 256864000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

DENA (9HED9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218480; MMSI 256861000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- DENA (9HED9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218480; MMSI 256861000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).

HUWAYZEH (9HEJ9) Crude Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212888; MMSI 256869000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY). -to- HUWAYZEH (9HEJ9) Crude Oil Tanker None Identified flag; Former Vessel Flag Malta; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212888; MMSI 256869000 (vessel) [IRAN] (Linked To: NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY).”

————————————————————–

Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

————————————————————–

International criminal defense questions, but want to be anonymous?

Free Skype Tel: +1.202.470.3427, OR

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Iran’s President Ties Recent Drop in Currency to U.S.-Led Sanctions

October 3, 2012

The New York Times on October 2, 2012 released the following:

“By THOMAS ERDBRINK

TEHRAN — Iran’s president admitted Tuesday that the American-led economic sanctions on the country were partly to blame for a breathtaking 40 percent fall in value of the Iranian currency, the rial, over the past week. He pleaded with Iranians not to exchange their money for dollars and other foreign currencies.

Speaking during a news conference broadcast live by several domestic and international Iranian news channels, the president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, said Iran was facing a “psychological war” waged by the United States and aided by what he described as internal enemies.

He said the currency’s fall was caused in part by the sanctions imposed by the West over Iran’s disputed nuclear program, which have prevented it from selling oil and transferring money. He also blamed a domestic band of “22 people in three separate circles” who with “one phone call” could manipulate foreign exchange trades in Iran.

One Web site, Mashregh News, reported Tuesday that Mr. Ahmadinejad had ordered the arrests of those “disturbing the currency market.”

The fall in the currency’s value has presented Iran with enormous economic risks, including the possibility of starting a severe bout of inflation, which is already high. A rising sense of economic crisis in Iran could also pose political challenges for the country’s leaders.

Mr. Ahmadinejad’s address was aimed at the teachers, bus drivers, businessmen and others who have been frantically converting their savings into dollars and euros at the dozens of unofficial currency-exchange shops in the center of Tehran.

“I ask you, dear people, do not change your money into foreign currency,” Mr. Ahmadinejad said, emphasizing that such moves would only help the “enemy.”

But a fresh day of currency fluctuations played out on Tuesday, with the rial falling, then strengthening before sinking again, to settle around its Monday record low of roughly 37,000 to the dollar. The rate had been 24,600 rials per dollar as of last Monday.

Addressing the mixed emotions expressed by many Iranians, who are confused over whether to blame economic mismanagement by the government or the Western sanctions, Mr. Ahmadinejad accused the United States and “internal enemies.”

He described the United States government as plotting to make Iranians miserable, emphasizing that the sanctions were hurting normal people instead of Iran’s leaders. “They are telling you lies, their pressures are on the people, not on the government,” he said.

Foreign exchange supplies in the country are sufficient to quench demand, he said, and he lauded the central bank, which he said had managed to “find ways” around the obstacles.

“The enemies are trying to blame the economic problems on the government. No. Never. There is no economic reason for these erratic ups and downs,” Mr. Ahmadinejad said. “I have no doubt that we will return to normal conditions.”

But he did not offer any specific solution to the crisis, and the rial’s value weakened after he spoke. The reaction prompted one person who exchanges currency to predict that the rial would continue to lose value against the dollar and other currencies.

Mr. Ahmadinejad said the economic pressures on Iran caused by the sanctions would never force it to compromise on the country’s uranium enrichment program, which Iranian leaders say is purely peaceful but the West suspects is a cloak for developing nuclear weapons capability. But the president repeated an earlier Iranian offer to stop enriching uranium to 20 percent purity, if world powers would be willing to provide Iran with that grade of nuclear fuel.

“We have announced that if they give us the fuel, we will stop production,” Mr. Ahmadinejad said. “But so far no one is prepared to do so.”

Also on Tuesday an Iranian lawmaker threatened that Iran would enrich uranium to 60 percent purity — much closer to bomb-grade material, if talks with world powers failed.

The lawmaker, Mansour Haghighatpour, deputy head of the foreign policy and national security committee in Parliament, said Iran needed the higher enriched fuel for still-to-be-designed nuclear submarines and ships, according to Press TV, Iran state television’s English language news channel.”

————————————————————–

Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

————————————————————–

International criminal defense questions, but want to be anonymous?

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Nuclear ruse: Posing as toymaker, Chinese merchant allegedly sought U.S. technology for Iran

August 13, 2012

The Washington Post on August 11, 2012 released the following:

“By Joby Warrick

The Chinese toymaker said he was seeking parts for a “magic horse,” a metal-framed playground pony. But the exotic, wildly expensive raw material he wanted seemed better suited for space travel than backyard play.

His shopping list, sent by e-mail to a Seattle factory, started with 20 tons of maraging steel, an ultra-strong alloy often used in rockets. The buyer didn’t flinch at the price tag — $2 million — but he repeatedly insisted on secrecy. “This material,” an associate confided in an e-mail, “are danger [sic] goods.”

Only in recent months did the full scope of the ruse become apparent. The destination for the specialty steel was not China but Iran, and the order had nothing to do with toy horses, U.S. investigators say.

“We are certain,” said a law enforcement official familiar with the case, “that the metal was meant for advanced centrifuges in Iran’s nuclear program.”

Last month, the Justice Department announced indictments against two people, one Chinese and the other Iranian, for conspiring to acquire maraging steel and other restricted American technology. U.S. officials say the case is part of a broader effort by Iran to dramatically expand its capacity to enrich uranium — with Chinese firms serving as willing accomplices.

The United States and its European allies have imposed ­ever-escalating sanctions intended to cut off Iran from sensitive technology and restricted material required for its nuclear program and to reduce its access to the global oil market. The goal is to stop Iran’s progress toward what the West believes is a nuclear arsenal, even as Iran maintains that its nuclear efforts are strictly part of a civilian energy program.

Maraging steel is a critical material in a new, highly efficient centrifuge that Iran has struggled for years to build. Barred by sanctions from buying the alloy legally, Iranian nuclear officials have sought to secretly acquire it from Western companies. In recent years, U.S. officials say, an increasing number of Chinese merchants have volunteered to help, serving as middlemen in elaborate schemes to obtain the steel and other forbidden material for Iran’s uranium enrichment plants as well as its missiles factories.

“They are not just stumbling on opportunities,” said Steve Pelak, the Justice Department’s counterespionage chief. “They are professional, studied procurement agents and shippers. They know precisely what business they’re in and how to go after it.”

The Seattle case is at least the fourth in the past two years in which companies based in China have been accused of helping Iran try to purchase sensitive technology. Although Iran has used Chinese go-betweens in the past, U.S. officials said sanctions have forced the isolated and besieged Iranian government to rely increasingly on China for economic help and access to restricted goods.

A senior Justice Department official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss ongoing investigations, said, “As some countries have retreated from the Iranian market with the imposition of increased sanctions, many Chinese companies appear to have moved into the void.”

Although the Obama administration has praised China for reducing its imports of Iranian oil in recent months, bilateral trade between Tehran and Beijing surged in the previous decade, from $2.5 billion in 2000 to $29.3 billion in 2010. The increase has softened the impact of international sanctions, U.S. officials and independent analysts say.

With the latest case, however, U.S. warnings about Iranian-­Chinese collusion have gained new urgency. If Iran can buy enough maraging steel on the black market, it can build more-efficient centrifuges, which will enrich uranium much faster than the machines it now uses.

“It is a major bottleneck in Iran’s production,” said David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector and author of a new study on Iranian procurement of nuclear technology. While Iran appears to have the know-how to make better centrifuges, the shortage of high-strength materials demanded by the new version — particularly maraging steel and carbon fiber — has prevented its scientists from producing more than a few hundred for testing, he said.

Officially, the Chinese government opposes a nuclear-armed Iran, and U.S. officials say Beijing has been a helpful ally during recent international negotiations aimed at pressuring the government to scale back its nuclear program. In addition, there is no evidence that China has provided nuclear assistance to Iran directly since the early 1990s.

Yet, despite repeated U.S. protests, Chinese businessmen continue to offer crucial assistance to Iran’s procurement efforts without fear of punishment or censure, U.S. officials and nuclear experts say.

An unusual order

Perhaps the most striking fact about the toy-horse plot, investigators say, is that it was discovered at all. The tip came in late 2008 from an obscure Homeland Security program that involves occasional factory visits by U.S. officials to guard against foreign pilfering of sensitive U.S. technology.

During a visit to a Puget Sound steelmaker, an export manager there told a U.S. official about a bizarre query he had gotten from China.

“It was a gigantic order: 20 tons of maraging steel,” recalled a law enforcement official familiar with the case.

The mention of maraging steel raised eyebrows because of the alloy’s use in missiles and centrifuges. Months passed with no follow-up to the initial inquiry from the prospective buyer, and efforts by U.S. officials to investigate the unusual order reached a dead end.

In the spring of 2009, a new query from China turned up in the steelmaker’s inbox. This time, the buyer claimed to represent a toy company, Monalila Co., a maker of playground equipment. The company Web site showed photographs of real toys, including its premier product, Model HF450, the “Magic Horse.”

“No gas, no battery, no power, but can be ride [sic] as a horse and run smoothly on squares, parks, alleys and any other flat grounds,” read the product description, displayed beneath a photo of a black-and-white toy pony with a saddle and cottony mane.

To make its ponies, the company needed the bulk order of maraging steel, wrote the purchasing agent, who identified himself as “Yi.” Except for the names and products, the $2 million order was identical to the one from the previous year.

U.S. investigators were alerted, and they set up a sting. In a chain of e-mails, federal agents posing as salesmen teased out details about the order and who was behind it. Eventually Yi excused himself and handed over the correspondence to his boss, a man he called “Martin.” It quickly became apparent that Martin was not Chinese and had no interest in toys.

“We were able to determine that Martin’s e-mail originated in Iran,” said the law-enforcement official familiar with the case.

Over the following months the shopping list grew, as the Iranian, with increasing boldness, piled on requests — other specialty metals used in uranium enrichment, an array of machines and instruments with known nuclear applications, even a mass spectrometer specifically calibrated to measure uranium fluorine gas, a key part of the enrichment process.

Investigators determined Martin’s real identity — Parviz Khaki. As part of the subterfuge, they confronted him about the possibility that the materials would be shipped illegally to Iran. Khaki did not appear to care, Justice Department officials said in an indictment handed down last month around the time of the man’s arrest.

“Khaki discussed his motivation to make money from this transaction,” the indictment stated.

On July 13, authorities in the Philippines arrested Khaki as he was boarding a plane in Manila. He had been indicted by a U.S. grand jury on charges of running a $30 million scheme to acquire banned U.S. technology for Iran. His alleged Chinese associate, Zongcheng Yi, was also indicted. Khaki remains in custody in Manila. Yi’s whereabouts are unknown.

Persistent flow of material

Khaki’s alleged plan to ship maraging steel to Iran through China was stopped, but federal officials concluded that the network delivered other nuclear-related components and tools to Tehran. Among them were corrosion-resistant nickel alloy and special lathes to manufacture centrifuge parts.

U.S. officials say the items are among several million dollars’ worth of material and parts — from missile components to electronics for roadside bombs — that have passed through China to Iran in the past five years. The flow of Western technology to Tehran is so persistent that it has emerged as an irritant in relations between Beijing and Washington, prompting the Obama administration to dispatch two delegations to Beijing since 2010 to complain.

Chinese officials have made occasional arrests but say they can’t always know of every attempt by a Chinese entrepreneur to make a profit by helping Iran shop for technology. But given the stakes, current and former U.S. officials and Iran experts continue to press Beijing to do more.”

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Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

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OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

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In Laundering Case, a Lax Banking Law Obscured Money Flow

August 9, 2012

The New York Times on August 8, 2012 released the following:

“By JESSICA SILVER-GREENBERG and EDWARD WYATT

The list of global banks that have been accused in recent years of laundering foreign transactions totaling billions of dollars has been growing — Credit Suisse, Lloyds, Barclays, ING, HSBC — and now Standard Chartered.

The details in each case are different, with the international banks suspected of using their American subsidiaries to process tainted money for clients that included Iran, Cuba, North Korea, sponsors of terrorist groups and drug cartels.

What the cases have in common is that the accused banks took advantage of a law that was not changed until 2008 and that allowed banks to disguise client identities and move their money offshore. The cases, including one filed this week by New York’s banking regulator against Standard Chartered, also cast a harsh light on just how much activity with Iran was permitted in the years leading up to 2008 and whether the practices had violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the law.

Foreign banks until 2008 were allowed to transfer money for Iranian clients through their American subsidiaries to a separate offshore institution. In the so-called U-turn transactions, the banks had to provide scant information about the client to their American units as long as they had thoroughly vetted the transactions for suspicious activity. Suspecting that Iranian banks were financing nuclear weapons and missile programs, the loophole was finally closed in 2008.

The new money-laundering claims made by the New York Department of Financial Services against Standard Chartered are particularly embarrassing for the Treasury Department, because they show how, until 2008, foreign banks could collaborate with their Iranian clients to circumvent United States sanctions, said Jimmy Gurulé, a former Treasury Department official who is a law professor at the University of Notre Dame.

Standard Chartered, as part of a strategy to ignore regulations imposed by a division of the Treasury Department, schemed with its Iranian clients to omit crucial details from money-transfer paperwork, according to a regulatory order filed Monday. An e-mail from a lawyer to bank executives in 2001 said that payment instructions for Iranian clients “should not identify the client or the purpose of the payment,” according to the order.

The strategy of masking client details was driven, in part, by a desire for speed, according to law enforcement officials involved in the money-laundering cases. Transactions with certain risky clients, like the Iranians, were subject to much more rigorous vetting. To avoid the holdup, the officials said, some foreign banks willfully removed the names.

Since January 2009, the Justice Department, Treasury and other government entities have brought charges against five foreign banks — the British banks Lloyds and Barclays; the Dutch banks Credit Suisse and ABN Amro, now the Royal Bank of Scotland; and ING Bank of Amsterdam. The British bank HSBC is also under investigation by United States authorities for suspected money-laundering violations connected to Iran, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Cuba and North Korea, and the bank has set aside $700 million to cover potential fines.

The settlements with the five banks generally included deferred prosecution agreements along with a substantial forfeiture of assets comparable in size to the basket of illegal transactions the banks engaged in. The five cases, which resulted from bank actions from 1995 through 2007, produced forfeitures of $2.3 billion over the last three and a half years. About half of that money went to Treasury and half to other entities, including the Manhattan district attorney’s office, which joined the Justice Department in most of the settlements.

So far, the Standard Chartered case is playing out entirely differently. To start with, action against the bank on Monday was brought by a single regulator, Benjamin M. Lawsky, a former prosecutor who now leads the New York Department of Financial Services. That is virtually unprecedented, since the vast majority of money-laundering charges come from regulators acting in concert.

The federal agencies are still investigating Standard Chartered and are debating just how expansive the suspected wrongdoing was. Mr. Lawsky claims the bank processed $250 billion in tainted money while cloaking the identities of its Iranian clients by stripping their names from paperwork. Some federal authorities, though, believe that the amount is closer to the $14 million that Standard Chartered acknowledges did not comply with regulations.

It is unclear whether the bank will settle with regulators or continue to fight. Standard Chartered must appear next week before Mr. Lawsky to explain the apparent violations and why it should not have its New York license revoked.

The divergent views on the bank’s culpability stem, in part, from the murkiness of the law governing how foreign institutions processed transactions with Iran.

Until 2008, American economic sanctions had a large exception for Iran because the Middle Eastern nation had such a vast oil business with the United States. The loophole permitted the U-turn transactions, allowing foreign institutions to route money to a bank in the United States, which would then transfer the money immediately to a different foreign institution.

Since Monday, Standard Chartered has fiercely argued that its transactions on behalf of Iranian banks and corporations fell squarely within that loophole. But Mr. Lawsky is largely basing his case on claims that the bank violated the law by covering up the identity of its Iranian clients and thwarting American efforts to detect money laundering.

In the settlements with the five banks since 2009, federal authorities and the Manhattan prosecutor accused the banks of “stripping” identifying information from some of the transactions that would have shown they were subject to sanctions and should not be allowed.

For example, in Lloyds’s $217 million settlement in 2009, senior bank managers warned colleagues in 2002 against “stripping” information from transactions referencing Iran, according to court records. In response, the records say, Lloyds simply began to “instruct Iranian banks on how to ‘clean’ payment instructions in which they were the originating bank to avoid detection” by Treasury Department filters.

The stripping constituted criminal conduct, the Justice Department said, when the transfers from sanctioned countries terminated in the United States — rather than taking a U-turn and heading back offshore. By ending in America, the transactions were subjected to stricter security standards, law enforcement officials said. In a letter sent Wednesday from Adam J. Szubin, director of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, to Britain’s Treasury office, the department explained its enforcement efforts both before and after the 2008 changes. Now, all cross-border transfers require “the inclusion of complete originator and beneficiary information,” according to the letter, which was obtained by The New York Times.

United States banks were involved in the pre-2008 transactions only as an intermediary, and American banks have generally not been charged with violations similar to those brought against the five foreign banks. Because American banks were prohibited from being the beginning or ending party in transactions involving Iran and other sanctioned countries, they would not have been involved in the conduct that got the foreign banks into trouble.

Since the tighter sanctions went into effect, there have been no charges brought on post-2008 conduct, although Treasury’s letter says that investigations are ongoing.

Gina Talamona, a Justice Department spokeswoman, said that the lack of recent illegal conduct is because the settlements with foreign banks “required the banks to implement rigorous compliance programs and other safeguards” against further violations of sanctions. She said that the department’s enforcement program “has had a significant impact on banking industry practices involving sanctions.””

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Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

————————————————————–

International criminal defense questions, but want to be anonymous?

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Fed Works With Prosecutors On Iran, Other Sanction Issues

August 7, 2012

Bloomberg on August 7, 2012 released the following:

“By Craig Torres

Federal Reserve Board spokeswoman Barbara Hagenbaugh said the central bank is working with prosecutors and the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control “on matters involving Iran and other sanctioned entities.”

“We cannot comment on ongoing investigations,” Hagenbaugh said by telephone. Hagenbaugh was responding to a query about accusations that Standard Chartered Plc violated U.S. money- laundering laws over its dealings with Iranian banks.”

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Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
OFAC SDN Removal Videos:

OFAC Litigation – SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN List Removal

OFAC SDN Removal Attorneys

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

————————————————————–

International criminal defense questions, but want to be anonymous?

Free Skype Tel: +1.202.470.3427, OR

Free Skype call:

           Office Locations

Email: